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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
In 2010, Samuel Glenn was charged with DUI. The State charged an 
enhancement for one or more felony convictions within fifteen years, which was 
premised on a case from 2001. However, Mr. Glenn had successfully completed his 
period of probation from the 2001 case and had, in 2007, moved the district court to 
grant him relief pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604. The district court granted that motion, 
allowed Mr. Glenn to withdraw his guilty plea, and dismissed the 2001 case. As such, 
Mr. Glenn moved to dismiss the 2010 indictment because it was premised on a non-
existent conviction. The district court denied that motion based on the Court of Appeals' 
recent decision in State v. Reed, 149 Idaho 901 (Ct. App. 2010). 
However, substantively, the Reed decision is directly contradictory to several 
Idaho Supreme Court decisions, including United States v. Sharp, State v. Parkinson, 
State v. Robinson, and Manners v. State Bd. of Veterinary Medicine. 1 The Reed 
Court also engaged in an exercise of statutory interpretation, delving into the perceived 
legislative intent behind I.C. § 19-2604, which was improper because I.C. § 19-2604 is 
unambiguous. As a result of that unnecessary exercise in statutory construction, the 
Reed decision also runs afoul of the Idaho Supreme Court's admonitions regarding 
statutory construction, which it recently reaffirmed in Verska (see note 1, supra). 
Because of the erroneous nature of the Court of Appeals' decision in Reed, 
Mr. Glenn respectfully requests that it be overruled, and, as a result, that the district 
1 Sharp, 145 Idaho 403 (2008); Parkinson, 144 Idaho 825 (2007) abrogated on other 
grounds by Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg 'I Med. etr., 151 Idaho 889 (2011); 
Robinson, 143 Idaho 306 (2006); Manners, 107 Idaho 950 (1985). 
1 
court's ruling on the motion to dismiss in this case, which was based on Reed, be 
reversed and Mr. Glenn's case remanded for further proceedings. Mr. Glenn has filed a 
contemporaneous motion requesting the Idaho Supreme Court retain this appeal, so 
that it may do just that. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In 2001, Mr. Glenn pled guilty to felony DUI.2 (See Presentence Investigation 
Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.4i He was sentenced to a unified term of five years, with 
one year fixed, although that sentence was suspended for a five-year period of 
probation. (PSI, p.47; see Augmentation - Court Minutes from August 8, 2001.) Upon 
satisfactorily completing that period of probation, Mr. Glenn moved the district court in 
2007 to reduce his charge to a misdemeanor. (R., pp.45-46.) 
The district court noted that, based on the language of I.C. § 19-2604,4 the relief 
Mr. Glenn requested (to reduce his charge to a misdemeanor) was unavailable, since 
the district court did not retain jurisdiction in his case. (See Augmentation - Court 
Minutes from March 21, 2007; pp.A24-A27, infra.) Instead, the district court treated 
Mr. Glenn's motion as a general petition for relief pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604. 
2 In this case, the district court took judicial notice of that case file, which is CR-FE-
2001-22 (formerly H0100022). (R., p.77.) The portions of that record which were 
definitely relevant to the issue now on appeal have been augmented to the appellate 
record. (Order [Granting In Part and Denying In Part Motion to Augment], (Sept. 11, 
2012).) 
3 PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic PDF file 
"GlennPSI." Included in this file is the PSI report as well as all the documents attached 
thereto (police reports, addendums to the PSI, etc.). 
4 As several versions of the relevant statutes are discussed in this brief, Mr. Glenn has 
provided an addendum pursuant to I.A.R. 35(f) containing reproductions of the statutes. 
The addendum is individually paginated using the identifier "A," so that the first page of 
the addendum is designated "A 1." 
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(Augmentation - Court Minutes from March 21, 2007.) The district court granted 
Mr. Glenn's motion, ordering: 
the defendant's plea of guilty shall be, and hereby is, set aside and this 
action is finally dismissed and the defendant discharged .... Samuel 
Thomas Glenn shall be, and hereby is, restored the full rights of 
citizenship. . . . This order of expungement is intended to provide 
defendant with the maximum degree of relief permissible under Idaho 
law .... 
(R., p.46.) 
Subsequently, in 2010, the State charged Mr. Glenn with a new felony DUI. 
(R., pp.1 0-11, 35-36.) It also sought to enhance h is sentence based on its assertion 
that he had a prior felony conviction under the same statute within the past fifteen 
years.5 (See, e.g., R., p.36.) However, the only possible basis for the enhancement 
was the dismissed 2001 DUI. (See Augmentation - Court Minutes from March 21, 
2007; PSI, pp.3-5 (Mr. Glenn's criminal record).) Mr. Glenn moved to dismiss the 
indictment in this case based on the fact that, pursuant to the district court's order in 
2007, the guilty plea in that case had been withdrawn and that case had been 
dismissed. (R., p.43.) 
5 This allegation was made pursuant to I.C. § 18-8005(9) (see p.A8, infra). (R., p.78.) 
I.C. § 18-8005(9) provides: 
(9) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (4) and (6) of this 
section, any person who has pled guilty or has been found guilty of a 
felony violation of the provisions of section 18-8004, Idaho Code, a felony 
violation of the provisions of section 18-8004C, Idaho Code, a violation of 
the provisions of section 18-8006, Idaho Code, a violation of the 
provisions of section 18-4006 3.(b), Idaho Code, notwithstanding the form 
of the judgment(s) or withheld judgment(s) or any substantially conforming 
foreign criminal felony violation, notwithstanding the form of the 
judgment(s) or withheld judgment(s), and within fifteen (15) years pleads 
guilty or is found guilty of a further violation of the provisions of section 18-
8004, Idaho Code, shall be guilty of a felony and shall be sentenced 
pursuant to subsection (6) of this section. 
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At a hearing on the motion to dismiss the indictment in this case, defense 
counsel conceded that the Court of Appeals' decision in Reed was on point, but 
contended that Reed should be overruled. (Tr., Vol. 1 , pp.8-11;6 see also R., pp.59-60.) 
After receiving briefing and argument from both parties, the district court denied 
Mr. Glenn's motion based on the Court of Appeals' decision in Reed. (R., pp.77-79.) 
In order to preserve the issue for appeal, Mr. Glenn entered a conditional guilty plea. 
(Tr., Vo1.2, p.5, L.20 - p.6, L.8.) The district court accepted that plea. (Tr., Vo1.2, p.20, 
Ls.19-20.) It subsequently sentenced Mr. Glenn to a unified term of ten years, with 
three years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.104-07.) Mr. Glenn appealed from 
that order, challenging the denial of his motion to dismiss. (R., pp.116-18.) 
6 The transcripts in this case are contained in two separately bound and paginated 
volumes. To promote clarity, the volume containing the transcript of the hearing for the 
motion to dismiss (held on May 27, 2011) will be referred to as "Vol. 1 ," and the volume 
containing transcripts of the entry of plea (held on June 1 0, 2011) and sentencing (held 
on December 9, 2011) hearings will be referred to as "VoI.2." 
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ISSUE 
Whether State v. Reed, 149 Idaho 901 (Ct. App. 2010), should be overruled, such that it 
was error to allow the State to enhance Mr. Glenn's sentence for driving under the 
influence because he has "pled guilty or has been found guilty of a felony violation of 
[the relevant code sections], notwithstanding the form of the judgment(s) or withheld 
judgment(s) ... within fifteen (15) years" where the necessary prior convictions no 
longer exists as the prior guilty plea had been withdrawn and the case dismissed. 
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ARGUMENT 
State v. Reed, 149 Idaho 901 (Ct. App. 2010), Should Be Overruled, Such That It 
Was Error To Allow The State To Enhance Mr. Glenn's Sentence For Driving Under 
The Influence Because He Had "Pled Guilty Or Has Been Found Guilty Of A Felony 
Violation Of [The Relevant Code Sections], Notwithstanding The Form Of The 
Judgment(s) Or Withheld Judgment(s) ... Within Fifteen (15) Years" Where The 
Necessary Prior Convictions No Longer Exists As The Prior Guilty Plea Had Been 
Withdrawn And The Case Dismissed 
A. Introduction 
The district court's decision to deny Mr. Glenn's motion to dismiss was in error 
because it did not adhere to established Idaho Supreme Court precedent on the issue. 
While the district court and counsel below were correct that Reed was not only on-point, 
but had similar facts to Mr. Glenn's case, the reliance on that decision to deny 
Mr. Glenn's motion was in error because the Court of Appeals' decision in Reed is in 
direct conflict with several recent decisions from the Idaho Supreme Court, including, 
but not limited to, Sharp, Parkinson, Robinson, and Manners. Furthermore, the Court 
of Appeals' effort at statutory interpretation in Reed was unnecessary, for the reasons 
set forth by the Idaho Supreme Court in Verska. Because of these significant 
shortcomings, Mr. Glenn requests that this Court overrule Reed. In addition, he 
requests this Court reverse the district court's order denying his motion to dismiss and 
remand the case for further proceedings. 
B. State Of The Law 
The question at issue in this case is whether, in enhancing a sentence for DUI 
under I.C. § 18-8005(9), a court may still treat a guilty plea that has been withdrawn in a 
case that has been dismissed as a predicate prior offense. 
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One of the Idaho Supreme Court's first considerations of this kind of question 
occurred in State v. Barwick, 94 Idaho 139 (1971). In the relevant portion of that 
opinion, the Idaho Supreme Court considered whether the State could impeach the 
defendant with evidence of a prior judgment of conviction from Florida. Barwick, 94 
Idaho at 143. That prior judgment had been vacated and an order of nolfo prosequi had 
been entered.? Id. The Idaho Supreme Court determined that the district court had 
erred in admitting that evidence because there was no valid conviction with which the 
State could properly impeach the defendant; once the case was dismissed, the 
conviction was "a nullity and the effect [was] as if it had never been rendered at all." Id. 
Relying on the invalid, null judgment necessitated a reversal of the defendant's 
conviction. Id. 
In a related context, the United States District Court for the District of Idaho was 
asked to consider the effect granting relief pursuant to I.C. §19-2604 would have on a 
defendant's record. United States v. Locke, 409 F.Supp. 600 (1976). That court 
determined that "compliance with I.C. § 19-2604 would result in a guilty plea and 
judgment being erased where an appropriate order is entered." Id. at 605. However, it 
found that such an order was lacking in that particular case. Id. 
The Idaho Supreme Court specifically addressed that same question in 1985. 
Manners, 107 Idaho 950. In that case, Dr. Manners, a licensed veterinarian, had pled 
guilty to felony delivery of a controlled substance, for which he was sentenced to a five-
year period of probation. Manners, 107 Idaho at 951. Upon successfully completing 
? The order of nollo prosequi indicated that the State was unwilling to prosecute the 
case and served to dismiss the case without prejudice. Sharp, 145 Idaho at 406 
(interpreting Barwick, 94 Idaho at 143, citing Wilson v. Renfroe, 91 SO.2d 857, 859 
(Fla.1957), and Smith v. State, 135 Fla. 835,186 So. 203 (1939)). 
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that period of probation, the district court allowed Dr. Manners to withdraw his guilty 
plea and enter a plea of not guilty. Id. The district court then dismissed the charges 
against Dr. Manners. Id. After he received that relief, the licensing board decided to 
revoke Dr. Manners's license, premised on that vacated felony conviction. Id. The 
Idaho Supreme Court first recognized that the suspended sentence constituted a 
conviction. Id. (citing State v. Wagenius, 99 Idaho 273, 278 (1978). However, it applied 
the rule established in Barwick - '''where a judgment has been vacated, it is a nullity, 
and the effect is as if it had never been rendered at all" - and determined that 
the BalWick rule applies when a district court affords a defendant relief pursuant to 
I.C. § 19-2604. Id. at 952. (citing favorably Locke, 409 F.Supp. 600). In reaching that 
decision, the Idaho Supreme Court rejected the idea that certain penalties and 
disabilities might still affect the defendant after relief had been granted. Id. To that 
point, it stated: 
We disagree with this view. Pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604 a court clearly has 
the authority to finally dismiss a case and discharge a defendant where 
such an act is compatible with the public interest, and defendant has 
satisfactorily completed the terms of probation. The final dismissal of a 
case 'shall have the effect of restoring the defendant to his civil rights. 
I.C. §19-2604(1). Nowhere in that statute is there language which limits or 
conditions the rights with defendant regains. 
Id. As a result, the district court reversed the board's decision to revoke Dr. Manners's 
license. Id. In doing so, the Manners Court established the fundamental rule regarding 
relief awards pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604: the conviction which is vacated becomes 
non-existent in the history of the case and is to be treated as if it had never existed at 
all. Id. 
The Idaho Supreme Court revisited this issue in State v. Bever, 118 Idaho 80 
(1990). In that case, the Court was asked to consider whether multiple charged 
8 
violations in the absence of actual convictions or guilty pleas of I.C. § 18-8004 (OUI) 
were sufficient to justify an enhanced penalty pursuant to I.C. § 18-8005. Id. at 80-81. 
The Idaho Supreme Court examined the language of I.C. § 18-8005(3), which, at that 
time, read: "Any person who pleads guilty to or is found guilty of three (3) or more 
violations of the provisions of section 18-8004, Idaho Code ... , within five (5) years, 
notwithstanding the form of the judgment(s) or withheld judgment(s), shall be guilty of a 
felony; .... " Id. at 81 (compare pp.A7-A 12, infra). The Court found that language to be 
ambiguous. Id. After engaging in the necessary statutory construction, the Idaho 
Supreme Court determined that: "In reviewing I.C. § 18-8005 in its entirety we conclude 
that I.C. § 18-8005(3) must be read to proscribe three guilty pleas or findings of guilty 
within a five year period." Id. at 82. As a result, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed the 
district court's denial of that defendant's motion to dismiss the enhancement. Id. 
In doing so, the Idaho Supreme Court reaffirmed that there must be a valid event of 
conviction on the defendant's record in order for it to be a sufficient basis for a 
subsequent deprivation. See id.; compare BalWick, 94 Idaho at 143; Manners, 107 
Idaho at 952. 
Therefore, the rule at the time the Court of Appeals considered State v. Deitz, 
120 Idaho 755 (Ct. App. 1991), was that, in order for a prior conviction to be available 
as a predicate felony for a subsequent punishment, there must be a valid event of 
conviction on that person's record, and a conviction vacated pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604 
was not available for such purposes. See BalWick, 94 Idaho at 143, Manners, 107 
Idaho at 952; Bever, 118 Idaho at 82. It was under this precedent that the Court of 
Appeals was asked to consider whether a judgment of conviction which had been 
subsequently vacated pursuant to I.C. §19-2604 could nevertheless support a 
9 
sentencing enhancement pursuant to I.C. § 18-8005. Deitz, 120 Idaho at 756. 
The Deitz Court did not follow the rule established by the Idaho Supreme Court, and 
instead, held that the enhancement was proper because Manners was inapplicable for 
two reasons: (1) Dr. Manners had actually been allowed to withdraw his guilty plea 
before the case was dismissed, while Mr. Deitz's case had only been dismissed 
(his guilty plea was never withdrawn); and (2) the legislative purpose underlying both 
I.C. § 18-8005 and I.C. § 19-2604 was to promote the defendant's rehabilitation and 
recidivism, and therefore, I.C. § 19-2604 could not grant relief where doing so would 
undermine the effects promoted by I.C. § 18-8005. Deitz, 120 Idaho at 757-58. The 
Deitz Court found that the decision in In re France, 38 627, 631-32 (1928) (holding that 
"this [provision allowing for dismissal of charges] and other humane provisions now 
generally recognized are not intended to apply to habitual criminals .... ") (emphasis 
added)) meant that I.C. §19-2604 could not be used to the extent argued by Mr. Deitz. 
With its decision in Deitz, the Court of Appeals broke from the established Idaho 
Supreme Court precedent.s Since then, it has furthered that division. 
For example, in 2000, the Court of Appeals considered whether a defendant 
could be exempted from the sex offender registration requirements of I.C. § 18-8304 
upon receiving relief pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604. State v. Perkins, 135 Idaho 17, 20 
(Ct. App. 2000). In that case, the withheld judgment for statutory rape was conditionally 
8 Former Judge Walters dissented from the majority's decision, recognizing that the 
Idaho Supreme Court's ruling in Manners meant that once relief was granted pursuant 
to I.C. § 19-2604, "the conviction is 'erased' and becomes 'non-existent.'" Deitz, 120 
Idaho at 758 (Walters, J., dissenting) (quoting Manners, 107 Idaho at 952). Judge 
Walters reminded that Court of Appeals that the application of the rule established by 
Manners meant that the prior "conviction" could not support the sentencing 
enhancement, and that the ambiguity in I.C. §18-8005 should be construed in the 
defendant's favor, meriting a reversal of the district court's decisions. Id. 
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dismissed based upon the defendant's immediate enlistment in the army and successful 
completion of a tour of duty. Id. at 18. The Court of Appeals, comparing the situation to 
that in Deitz, found that allowing relief pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604 to remove the 
defendant from the registration requirement would undermine the purpose of I.C. § 18-
8304 and, therefore, could not be a valid interpretation of the statutes. Id. at 21. There 
were also provisions in I. C. §§ 18-8301, et. seq., which served to exempt the 
registration requirement from the relief afforded pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604. See id. 
As in Deitz, in Perkins, one member of the panel disagreed with the majority, 
reminding the Court of Appeals of the rule governing relief awards pursuant to I.C. § 19-
2604, to which the Court of Appeals was not adhering. Id. at 22-23 (Schwartzman, J., 
specially concurring). Judge Schwartzman only concurred in the result because there 
was only a conditional dismissal order; no formal dismissal order was ever enacted. 
Regardless, Judge Schwartzman declared: 
Were the original plea of guilty set aside and the case fully and finally 
dismissed pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604(1), thus completing the statutory 
expungement process, I would vote differently herein. A true 
expungement would leave no plea of guilty or finding of guilt upon which 
the Sexual Offender Registration Act could hang its jurisdictional hat. 
Id. (emphasis in original). As Judge Schwartzman pointed out, the rule remained that a 
relief grant pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604 meant that vacated conviction and dismissed 
case could not be used as a predicate to a future punishment. 
Despite the Court of Appeals' decision in Perkins, the Idaho Legislature still 
found it necessary to amend I.C. § 19-2604 in 2006 so that I.C. § 19-2604 would not 
release any person from the registration requirements of I.C. § 18-8304. 2006 Idaho 
Laws Ch. 157 (S.B. 1304) (see pp.A24-25, infra); see State v. Hardwick, 150 Idaho 580, 
581 (2011). This would suggest that the Idaho Legislature felt that the Perkins decision 
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was on shaky ground, and that relief afforded pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604 was able to 
relieve a person of the registration requirements. It does not seem necessary for the 
Legislature to amend the law if the Perkins decision were correct. 
In 2005, the Court of Appeals enlarged the gulf between its analysis and the rule 
established by the Idaho Supreme Court. In State v. Woodbury, 141 Idaho 547 
(Ct. App. 2005), the defendant claimed he had not been adequately informed that, as a 
consequence of his guilty plea and withheld judgment, he would be subject to future 
penalties, and so moved to withdraw his guilty plea. Id. at 548. The Court of Appeals, 
in dicta, declared that relief afforded pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604 would only partially 
cleanse a defendant's record, but would still be available as a prior conviction in various 
situations, including disqualification from possessing a liquor license and enhancement 
of future penalties for DUI. Id. at 549. With this statement, the Court of Appeals 
highlighted the break in analysis between its decisions and those in Bever and 
Manners, which had held the opposite. 
Despite these inteNening decisions from the Court of Appeals, the Idaho 
Supreme Court has continued to apply the rule it set forth in Barwick, Manners, and 
Bever. For example, even though the Court of Appeals held in Deitz that there was a 
notable difference between the situation where a guilty plea was explicitly withdrawn 
prior to dismissal of the case, and the situation where the guilty plea was not explicitly 
withdrawn prior to dismissal of the case, the Idaho Supreme Court declared in 2006: 
It does not matter what form the leniency takes, be it dismissing charges 
or allowing withdrawal of a guilty plea or both. We are not persuaded by 
Robinson's attempt to draw a distinction between cases where a district 
court sets aside a guilty plea and those where it does not. ... If a case 
has been dismissed, there is no longer anything in which a judgment of 
conviction can stand; likewise, if a charge has been dismissed there no 
longer remains a conviction for that charge. An order purporting to dismiss 
12 
a criminal case without vacating the conviction is invalid, and a guilty plea 
in a criminal case would necessarily be vacated once the dismissal in the 
underlying criminal case is final. This is true even if the order does not 
expressly state that the plea was being set aside. 
Robinson, 143 Idaho at 310. In fact, it effectively abrogated Deitz's analysis as to 
whether the Manners rule defines the effect of a relief award pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604: 
it does, because the conviction was vacated, and so, was non-existent, unable to be the 
foundation for a future deprivation. Id. 
The Idaho Supreme Court was presented with this issue again the next year 
in Parkinson. There, while recognizing some of the underlying conclusions of the Deitz 
and Perkins decisions (i.e., I.C. § 19-2604 does not result in a full expungement of the 
defendant's record; the conviction is not fully erased, nor is it premised on a finding of 
factual innocence), the Idaho Supreme Court reaffirmed that "[w]here a judgment has 
been vacated under this statute, 'it is a nullity, and the effect is as if it had never been 
rendered at all,' and there are no limits or conditions on the rights the defendant 
regains." Parkinson, 144 Idaho 825 (quoting Manners, 107 Idaho at 952 (quoting 
Barwick, 94 Idaho at 143)). Therefore, even though the foundational analysis in Deitz 
and Perkins might be accurate, their conclusions were not (i.e., those opinions were 
abrogated by a subsequent Idaho Supreme Court decision) - the rule, established in 
Barwick and Manners, remains the same: a prior conviction, vacated pursuant to 
I.C. § 19-2604, cannot serve as a predicate felony for a subsequent punishment. See 
Parkinson, 144 Idaho at 828. 
Most recently, in 2008, the Idaho Supreme Court confirmed that "[a]n outstanding 
withheld judgment based on a guilty plea qualifies as a conviction under Idaho law." 
Sharp, 145 Idaho at 407 (emphasis added). With that statement, the Idaho Supreme 
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Court reaffirmed that the judgment of conviction must still be validly on the defendant's 
record to serve as the predicate felony for a subsequent charge. Id. at 406 (discussing 
Barwick, reaffirming that it "stands for the proposition that when a judgment, sentence, 
and conviction were vacated ... the defendant does not have a conviction"). As such, 
the rule from the Idaho Supreme Court remains that, where a guilty plea has been 
withdrawn and the case dismissed pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604, there is no valid 
conviction upon which a subsequent penalty can be predicated. 
Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals continues to adhere to the abrogated Deitz 
rationale to allow exactly that. See, e.g., Reed, 149 Idaho 901. After he successfully 
completed a period of probation following a guilty plea to DUI, Mr. Reed petitioned 
the district court for relief pursuant to I.C. §19-2604(1). Id. at 902. The district court 
granted that motion, ordering "Reed's 'former plea of guilty is unconditionally withdrawn, 
and the plea is deemed as though it had never been tendered to or accepted by the 
Court, [Reed's] plea of not guilty I reinstated in this matter, and the matter is hereby 
dismissed, with prejudice." Id. at 902. Subsequently, the State sought to use that 
vacated conviction and dismissed case as a predicate felony conviction for a sentencing 
enhancement pursuant to I.C. § 18-8005. Id. The Court of Appeals, however, relied on 
the rule it established in Deitz (which is contrary to that from the Idaho Supreme Court 
in Manners, et a/.) and determined that based on its decisions in Deitz, Perkins and 
Woodbury, the vacated judgment of conviction and dismissed case could serve as the 
predicate offense for a subsequent sentencing enhancement. Reed, 149 Idaho at 
903-04. The Court of Appeals reaffirmed its conclusion that both I.C. §§ 18-8005 and 
19-2604 were ambiguous, so as to necessitate an examination of the legislative intent 
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behind those code sections. 9 See id. at 904. As such, despite the rule established by 
the Idaho Supreme Court in Barwick and Manners, which was reaffirmed in Parkinson 
and Sharp, the Court of Appeals allowed the dismissed charge to serve as the predicate 
felony for a sentencing enhancement. Id. at 904-05. 
The evolution of the case law in this area reveals that, under Idaho Supreme 
Court precedent, a prior conviction, which has been vacated and the underlying charges 
dismissed, may not serve as a predicate felony for subsequent punishments, while 
under the contrary Court of Appeals precedent, it may. As such, the Reed decision, 
premised on the Court of Appeals' break from the rule established by the Idaho 
Supreme court is manifestly wrong (contrary to controlling precedent) and should be 
overruled to vindicate the plain, obvious principles of law recognized by the Idaho 
Supreme Court in order to remedy continued injustice. See, e.g., State v. Watts, 142 
Idaho 230, 232 (2005). 
C. The Decision In Reed Should Be Overruled, As It Is Contrary To Idaho Supreme 
Court Precedent, And, As A Result, The District Court's Decision In Mr. Glenn's 
Case, Which Was Premised On Reed, Should Be Reversed 
Prior to Reed, the Idaho Supreme Court had already established that even H[a]n 
outstanding withheld judgment based on a guilty plea qualifies as a conviction under 
Idaho law." Sharp, 145 Idaho at 407. As such, outstanding judgments can be the basis 
for sentencing enhancements, such as the enhancement found in I.C. § 18-8005(9) 
(see pp.A7-A8, infra). See id. However, the key language in Sharp was that the 
9 The Supreme Court resolved the ambiguity in the relevant portions of I.C. § 18-8005 in 
Bever. See Bever, 118 Idaho at 82 (holding that the statute requires valid pleas or 
convictions in order to serve as the predicate felony for an enhancement under 
I.C. § 18-8005). 
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judgment must still be "outstanding" in order for the judgment to qualify as a conviction. 
Id.; see also Bever, 118 Idaho at 81 (holding that the statute requires actual events of 
conviction, rather than mere assertions of violations). Sharp's requirement that the 
conviction be "outstanding" is in accordance with the Idaho Supreme Court's prior 
decisions. See, e.g., Barwick, 94 Idaho at 143; Manners, 107 Idaho at 952; Parkinson, 
144 Idaho at 828. According to the Idaho Supreme Court, when such a judgment was 
vacated and there was no longer a conviction event, that case could not be the basis for 
attacking the defendant's credibility during testimony. Barwick, 94 Idaho at 143. Nor 
could such a vacated conviction be the sole basis for a subsequent punishment or 
deprivation of civil rights. Manners, 107 Idaho at 952 (reaffirmed in this regard by 
Parkinson, 144 Idaho at 828). The reason was that, once the judgment "has been 
vacated, i[t] is a nullity and the effect is as if it had never been rendered at all.,,10 
BalWick, 94 Idaho at 143; Manners, 107 Idaho at 952; Parkinson, 144 Idaho at 828. 
The Idaho Supreme Court's ruling in Manners demonstrates the extent of this 
rule. 11 In that case, Dr. Manners completed a period of probation following his 
conviction via guilty plea. Manners, 107 Idaho at 951. Upon his motion, the district 
court permitted him to withdraw his guilty plea and the case against him was dismissed. 
10 Compare, e.g., Manners, 107 Idaho at 952 (when the conviction "has been vacated, 
i[t] is a nullity and the effect is as if it had never been rendered at all") with I.C. § 20-
525A (providing that, "[u]pon the entry of the order the proceedings in the petitioner's 
case shall be deemed never to have occurred .... "). The Idaho Supreme Court has 
essentially said that I.C. § 19-2604 has the same effect regarding a criminal record 
which the Legislature explicitly permits in regard to juveniles pursuant to I.C. § 20-
525A. See, e.g., Barkwick 94 Idaho at 143; Manners, 107 Idaho at 952; Parkinson, 144 
Idaho at 828. Since the judgment is deemed to never have occurred when relief is 
granted pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604, there is no conviction event in Mr. Glenn's record 
upon which to bring the enhancement. 
11 The procedural facts in Manners are almost identical to those in Mr. Glenn's case. 
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Id. Subsequently, the Idaho Supreme Court found that in such a scenario, the 
conviction and judgment (imposed, suspended, and ultimately withdrawn) was made 
null, as if it had never been, and therefore, could not be the basis for the revocation of 
Dr. Manners' veterinary license. Id. at 952. In doing so, the Idaho Supreme Court 
explicitly rejected the contention that relief under I.C. § 19-2604 still left the defendant 
open to certain, subsequent punishments: 
In a number of states, statutes similar to I.C. § 19-2604 have been 
interpreted to erase a conviction and to release defendant from some, but 
not all, 'penalties and disabilities.' Disbarment and license revocation are 
not among the penalties and disabilities released by discharge from 
probation. 
We disagree with this view. Pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604 a court 
clearly has authority to finally dismiss a case and discharge defendant 
where such an act is compatible with the public interest, and defendant 
has satisfactorily completed the terms of probation. The final dismissal of 
a case "shall have the effect of restoring the defendant to his civil rights." 
I.C. § 19-2604(1). Nowhere in that statute is there language which limits 
or conditions the rights which defendant regains. 
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Instead, the Idaho Supreme Court reaffirmed 
that: "where a judgment has been vacated, it is a nullity, and the effect is as if it had 
never been rendered at all." Id. (quoting Barwick, 94 Idaho at 143); see also Locke, 409 
F.Supp. at 604 ("[C]ompliance with I.C. § 19-2604 would result in a guilty plea and 
judgment being erased where an appropriate order is entered.") (emphasis added). 
As in Manners, Mr. Glenn was permitted to withdraw his guilty plea and the case 
against him was dismissed. (R., p.46.) Therefore, as in Manners, his conviction was a 
nullity, to be treated as non-existent in history. Manners, 107 Idaho at 952; Barwick, 
94 Idaho at 143. Additionally, as in Manners, Mr. Glenn had his civil rights restored to 
him. (R., p.46.) As such, just as in Manners, the reliance on that non-existent 
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conviction to justify the subsequent punishment was in error. See Manners, 107 Idaho 
at 952. 
And even though BalWick and Manners only speak in terms of "judgment," the 
rationale clearly extends to the event of conviction as well. Robinson, 143 Idaho at 310 
(holding that once a dismissal is final, the district court also must necessarily dismiss 
the guilty plea because, otherwise, the order purporting to dismiss the case would be 
invalid as a matter of law, and that result is unacceptable); Parkinson, 144 Idaho at 828 
(recognizing that a conviction is at least partially erased by I.C. § 19-2604 relief, so far 
as to be unavailable to be the predicate for a deprivation of civil rights); see also Locke, 
409 F.Supp. at 604 (recognizing that relief granted pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604 erases 
both the judgment and the guilty plea); United States v. Bays, 589 F.3d 1035, 1038-39 
(9th Cir. 2009) (recognizing that, under Parkinson, when a court affords relief pursuant 
to I.C. § 19-2604, "the conviction is vacated and becomes a nUllity. It is treated as 
though the judgment was never rendered and 'there are no limits or conditions on the 
rights defendant regains'" (citing Parkinson, 144 Idaho at 827-28) (emphasis added)). 
As such, the only logical conclusion from Manners, et al., is that once the judgment is 
vacated and the event of conviction is expressly or impliedly withdrawn, that case 
cannot serve as the predicate offense for a sentence enhancement like the one found 
in I.C. § 18-8005(9), as was permitted in Mr. Glenn's case. 
This means that when relief was granted pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604, Mr. Glenn's 
conviction (i.e., his guilty plea) and judgment became nullities - to be treated as if 
they never existed. See, e.g., Sharp, 145 Idaho at 406; BalWick, 94 Idaho at 143; 
Manners, 107 Idaho at 952; see also State v. Deitz, 120 Idaho 755, 758 (Ct. App. 1991) 
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(Walters, J., dissenting).12 Regardless of the Idaho Supreme Court's decisions (and 
without discussion of the critical opinions of Sharp and Manners at all), the Court of 
Appeals in Reed, held directly contrary to the Idaho Supreme Court's rule, allowing a 
subsequent punishment to be premised on a withdrawn plea, vacated judgment, and 
dismissed case. See Reed, 149 Idaho at 904-05. Because it is directly contrary to 
established Idaho Supreme Court precedent, Reed should be overruled. Additionally, 
the district court's denial of Mr. Glenn's motion predicated on the erroneous decision in 
Reed, should be reversed. 
D. The Decision In Reed Was The Culmination Of The Court Of Appeals' Break 
From Idaho Supreme Court Precedent In Deitz, And The Reliance On The 
Erroneous Analysis In Deitz Reveals The Need To Overrule Reed 
The Court of Appeals attempted to justify its decision in Reed by looking to its 
prior decision in Deitz, wherein it had departed from established Idaho Supreme Court 
precedent. See Reed, 149 Idaho at 902-03 (citing Deitz, 120 Idaho 755). In Oeitz, the 
Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision because, in its opinion, the critical 
inquiry should focus on the determination of guilt, and the dismissal of the first offense 
"did not reverse or vacate the determination of Deitz's guilt for purposes of I.C. § 18-
8005(4)." Id. at 756-58. It also attempted to distinguish Manners for two reasons: 
(1) Dr. Manners was specifically allowed to withdraw his guilty plea before the charges 
12 In fact, a bill was submitted to the Idaho House of Representatives which would have 
amended I.C. § 19-2604 to state that relief afforded pursuant to that statute would not 
expunge the person's record. H.R. 71, 60th Leg. (2009), http://www.legislature.idaho. 
gov/legislation/2009/H0071 Bookmark.htm. That language would have supported the 
district court's decision. However, that bill failed in a vote in the House. Idaho House of 
Representatives, JOURNAL OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL SESSION AND FIRST REGULAR SESSION 
OF THE SIXTIETH LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, 1st Sess., at 127 (2009), 
http://legislature.idaho.gov/sessioninfo/2009/journals/hfinal.pdf. 
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were dismissed, while Mr. Deitz only had the underlying charges dismissed; and (2) the 
legislative intent of the statute would exempt people like Mr. Deitz from the statute. Id. 
The Reed Court reaffirmed these rationales. Reed, 149 Idaho at 902-03. However, 
based on Idaho Supreme Court precedent, it is mistaken on both counts. 
First, Deitz suggested that Manners was not controlling because Mr. Deitz's 
guilty plea had not been changed or withdrawn before the conviction was set aside; 
rather, he had just been discharged from probation and the charges dismissed. 
Deitz, 120 Idaho at 757; see Reed, 149 Idaho at 902-03 (asserting that any limitation on 
Deitz in regard to the need to withdraw the guilty plea has since been removed; it can 
be used in a subsequent prosecution regardless of whether the plea was withdrawn). 
That perspective is contrary to established Idaho Supreme Court precedent, which 
holds that dismissing the case necessarily includes withdrawing the underlying guilty 
plea, lest it render the district court's order invalid. See, e.g., Robinson, 143 Idaho at 
310. In Robinson, the Idaho Supreme Court did not adopt the Deitz Court's 
perspective, but instead, held to the contrary: 
It does not matter what form the leniency takes, be it dismissing charges 
or allowing withdrawal of a guilty plea or both. We are not persuaded by 
Robinson's attempt to draw a distinction between cases where a district 
court sets aside a guilty plea and those where it does not. ... If a case 
has been dismissed, there is no longer anything in which a judgment of 
conviction can stand; likewise, if a charge has been dismissed there no 
longer remains a conviction for that charge. An order purporting to dismiss 
a criminal case without vacating the conviction is invalid, and a guilty plea 
in a criminal case would necessarily be vacated once the dismissal in the 
underlying criminal case is final. This is true even if the order does not 
expressly state that the plea was being set aside. 13 
13 Even the Court of Appeals has recognized that principle, although it misread the rule 
to allow it to invalidate the district court's order, instead of giving the district court's order 
the force that was intended when it was entered. Compare State v. Dorn, 140 Idaho 
404, 406 (Ct. App. 2004) ("[W]e think that the order at issue here would be invalid for 
another reason. The order purports to dismiss the charge against Dorn without vacating 
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Robinson, 143 Idaho at 310. Therefore, the Reed Court's reliance on the Deitz Court's 
analysis regarding the need to withdraw the guilty plea is erroneous. The Idaho 
Supreme Court rejected (and effectively abrogated) the Deitz distinction in this 
regard. 14 Robinson, 143 Idaho at 310. Rather, if the charges are dismissed, the 
guilty plea is necessarily withdrawn. Id. Continuing to rely on a withdrawn guilty plea is 
inappropriate. Barwick, 94 Idaho at 143; Manners, 107 Idaho at 952; see Deitz, 120 
Idaho at 758 (Walters, C.J., dissenting). Therefore, since the Deitz analysis was 
subsequently abrogated by the Idaho Supreme court in Robinson, the Reed Court erred 
in relying on the Deitz analysis in that regard. 
Second, the Deitz Court's exercise in statutory construction, which the Reed 
Court affirmed and applied, was also erroneous. The Deitz interpretation, which 
allowed for subsequent punishments premised on withdrawn (and thus, non-existent) 
convictions, departed from the plain, unambiguous language of the statute. See Deitz, 
120 Idaho at 757-58; Reed, 149 Idaho at 904; compare I.C. § 19-2604. The Idaho 
Supreme Court has said that, where the statute is unambiguous, exercises in statutory 
the conviction entered against him. Such an outcome cannot be legally accomplished.") 
(emphasis added)) with Robinson, 143 Idaho at 310 (declaring that the district court's 
apparently-deficient order actually does accomplish all that it needed to make it valid). 
This is another notable break between the Court of Appeals and Idaho Supreme 
Court analyses: were the Court of Appeals decision allowed to trump the Idaho 
Supreme Court precedent, than a conviction would continue to exist on the defendant's 
record because no valid order could remove it (but see, e.g., Locke, 409 F.Supp. at 604, 
Robinson, 143 Idaho at 310), whereas, if the Court of Appeals follows the Idaho 
Supreme Court precedent, the order granting relief is given its full and intended effect, 
the conviction is vacated, and as such, is unavailable to be the predicate felony for a 
subsequent punishment. See, e.g., Manners, 107 Idaho at 952. 
14 The abrogation of Deitz reveals that the Manners rule should have governed the 
result in Deitz, as Judge Walters argued in his dissent. See Deitz, 120 Idaho at 758 
(Walters, J., dissenting). Under Manners, the vacated conviction was unavailable as 
the necessary predicate felony for the sentencing enhancement. See id. 
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interpretation are inappropriate. Worley Highway Dist. v. Kootenai County, 98 Idaho 
925, 928 (1978).15 Idaho Code §19-2604 (as it was written when Mr. Glenn received 
relief in 2007) was unambiguous. (See pp.A24-A27, infra.) 
(1) If sentence has been imposed but suspended, or if sentence has 
been withheld, upon application of the defendant and upon satisfactory 
showing that the defendant has at all times complied with the terms 
and conditions upon which he was placed on probation ... the court 
may, if convinced by the showing made that there is no longer cause 
for continuing the period of probation, and if it be compatible with the 
public interest, terminate the sentence or set aside the plea of guilty or 
conviction of the defendant, and finally dismiss the case and discharge 
the defendant; and this shall apply to the cases in which defendants 
have been convicted and granted probation by the court before this law 
goes into effect, as well as to cases which arise thereafter. The final 
dismissal of the case as herein provided shall have the effect of 
restoring the defendant to his civil rights. 
(2) If sentence has been imposed but suspended during the first one 
hundred eighty (180) days of a sentence to the custody of the state 
board of correction, and the defendant placed upon probation as 
15 This principle was emphatically reaffirmed by the Idaho Supreme Court in Verska. 
151 Idaho at 896. Moreover, Verska did not announce a new rule, but rather, reaffirmed 
the long-standing principle that the courts do not engage in any statutory interpretation 
when the statute is unambiguous. See Verska, 151 Idaho at 894-96. For example, 
"[w]e must follow the law as written. If it is socially or economically unsound, the power 
to correct it is legislative, not judiciaL" Herndon v. West, 87 Idaho 335, 339 (1964). 
Similarly, "[w]e have recognized and applied the rule of construction that where a 
statute or constitutional provision is plain, clear, and unambiguous, it 'speaks for itself 
and must be given the interpretation the language clearly implies.'" Moon v. Investment 
Bd. of the State of Idaho, 97 Idaho 595, 596 (1976) (quoting State v. Jonasson, 78 
Idaho 205, 210 (1956». 
Most pertinent, however, is the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in 1978, which 
clearly prohibited the action from Deitz and its progeny upon which the Reed Court 
relied (see Reed, 149 Idaho at 903-04): "This Court has consistently adhered to the 
primary canon of statutory construction that where the language of the statute is 
unambiguous, the clear expressed intent of the legislature must be given effect and 
there is no occasion for construction." Worley Highway Dist., 98 Idaho at 928 (quoting 
State v. Riley, 83 Idaho 346, 349 (1961) (emphasis added». Deitz and Reed ignored 
this principle and engaged in statutory construction on an unambiguous statute, which it 
was not authorized to do. See Deitz, 120 Idaho at 757-58; Reed, 149 Idaho at 902-04. 
This is yet another reason that Reed should be overruled. 
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provided in subsection 4. of section 19-2601,16 Idaho Code, upon 
application of the defendant, the prosecuting attorney, or upon the 
court's own motion, and upon satisfactory showing that the defendant 
has at all times complied with the terms and conditions of his 
probation, the court may amend the judgment of conviction from a term 
in the custody of the state board of correction to "confinement in a 
penal facility" for the number of days served prior to suspension, and 
the amended judgment may be deemed to be a misdemeanor 
conviction. 
(3) Subsection (2) of this section shall not apply to any judgment of 
conviction for a violation of any offense requiring sex offender 
registration as set forth in section 18-8304, Idaho Code. A judgment of 
conviction for a violation of any offense requiring sex offender 
registration as set forth in section 18-8304, Idaho Code, shall not be 
subject to dismissal or reduction under this section. A conviction for the 
purposes of this chapter means that the person has pled guilty or has 
been found guilty, notwithstanding the form of the judgment or withheld 
judgment. 17 
I.C. § 19-2604(1), (3) (2006).18 The statute clearly reveals that the only limitations to the 
relief available therein were to relief afforded pursuant to I.C. §19-2604(2). Id. (looking 
16 At the time Mr. Glenn was afforded relief, I.C. § 19-2601 (4) referred to the situation 
where the defendant's sentence is initially executed but is subsequently suspended 
within the first one-hundred eighty days of execution. I.C. § 19-2601 (4) (2005) 
(see pp.A15-A17, infra). However, Mr. Glenn's situation fell under I.C. §19-2601(2) 
because his sentence was suspended "at the time judgment". See id. Therefore, 
I.C. § 19-2601 (2), not I.C. § 19-2601 (4) governed Mr. Glenn's case. As such, when it 
granted his motion for relief in 2007, the district court correctly held that the relief 
articulated in I.C. § 19-2604(2) was not applicable to Mr. Glenn's case. (See R., p.46.) 
17 I.C. § 19-2604(1) was amended in 2010, expanding the period of time during which 
the district court could suspend a sentence and subsection (2) would be applicable. 
2010 Idaho Laws Ch. 350 (S.B. 1383) (see pp.A22-A23, infra). It was amended again 
in 2011, giving the district court the alternative to reduce the charge to a misdemeanor 
in addition to the ability to fully dismiss the case. 2011 Idaho Laws Ch. 187 (H.B. 226) 
(see pp.A20-A21, infra). As such, neither of the subsequent amendments support the 
Reed Court's conclusion that the Deitz construction is valid or the district court's 
conclusion that it is applicable to Mr. Glenn's case. 
18 There were two other amendments to I.C. § 19-2604, which were passed in 2006. 
The first was to subsections (1) and (2), allowing for relief to be granted when the 
defendant showed that he had completed a drug or mental health court program. 
2006 Idaho Laws Ch. 104 (H.B. 716) (pp.A26-A27, infra). The second was to 
subsection (3), expanding the exception therein from three specific crimes to any 
offense requiring sex offender registration. 2006 Idaho Laws Ch. 157 (S.B. 1304) 
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specifically at subsection (3)). Subsection (2) was inapplicable to Mr. Glenn's case 
because he was not placed on probation pursuant to I.C. § 19-2601 (4). (See note 16, 
supra.) Since Subsection (2) was inapplicable to Mr. Glenn's case, the relief available 
to him was unrestricted. 19 
Furthermore, Subsection (1), under which Mr. Glenn would have been granted 
relief, was and is unambiguously unlimited in its scope, as well as to the relief afforded: 
"terminate the sentence or set aside the plea of guilty or conviction of the defendant, 
and finally dismiss the case and discharge the defendant .... " I.C. § 19-2604(1). 
And because it is unambiguous, it must be given the force and effect as written.20 
Verska, 151 Idaho at 894-96; Worley Highway Dist., 98 Idaho at 928. 
(pp.A24-A25, infra). However, neither amendment was applicable to Mr. Glenn's case, 
nor did they restrict the relief available to him. 
19 Even if I.C. § 19-2604(2) is applicable to Mr. Glenn's case, the relief available to him 
was not restricted because the restriction in the statute was very specific and limited to 
only those persons required to register as sex offenders pursuant to I.C. §18-8304. 
I.C. § 19-2604(3) (2006) (see pp.A4-A6, infra). As a DUI did not subject Mr. Glenn to 
the registration statute (see I.C. § 18-8304 (2006) (pp.A3-A4, infra), the relief available 
to him, even under I.C. § 19-2604(2), was not restricted. Furthermore, he was explicitly 
granted the maximum relief available by the district court. (R., pA7.) As the statute is 
unambiguous in this regard, engaging in statutory interpretation to extend those relief 
restrictions beyond the scope of the statute was wholly improper, and as such, Reed's 
reliance on that improper interpretation reveals that Reed should be overruled. 
20 Even if this Court determines that statutory interpretation is necessary, the Court of 
Appeals' interpretation is revealed to be erroneous by the Legislature's own comments 
in regard to these statutes. According to the Legislature, when it created the exception 
to the broad relief afforded by I.C. § 19-2604 in 2006: "The purpose of this act is to 
update subsection 3 to except all offenses requiring sexual offender registration as set 
forth in Idaho Code 18-8304 from the dismissal or reduction of conviction provisions of 
subsections 1 and 2 of the act." 2006 Idaho Laws Ch. 157 (S.B. 1304) (pp.A24-A25, 
infra). As the Legislature clearly indicated, it believed that relief afforded under 
I.C. § 19-2604 did afford a "dismissal" of the conviction, despite the language of the 
other statutes, such as I.C. § 18-8304. See id. As a result, it crafted an exception 
specifically in regard to the sexual offender registration statute. See id. It did not 
extend that exception to any other statutes, including I.C. § 18-8005. See id. 
Therefore, even if statutory construction is necessary, that exception should not be 
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The Reed Court also believed that exceptions to § 19-2604 are built into other 
statutes. Reed, 149 Idaho at 904. However, those other statutes presume a valid 
judgment remains on the defendant's record, and I.C. §19-2604 unambiguously makes 
the valid judgment and underlying event of conviction non-existent within the entire 
history of the case: "[w]here a judgment has been vacated under [I.C. § 19-2604], 'it is 
a nullity, and the effect is as if it had never been rendered at all." Robinson, 143 Idaho 
at 308 (quoting Manners, 107 Idaho at 952 (quoting Barwick, 94 Idaho at 143)) 
(emphasis added). The relevant language from all three statutes upon which the Reed 
Court relied is: "notwithstanding the form of the judgment(s) or withheld judgment(s)." 
I.C. §§ 18-8005(4); 18-8005(6); 18-8304 (see pp.A2-A3, A7-A8, infra). The fact that the 
Legislature was only concerned with "the form of the judgment reveals that the 
Legislature presumed a valid judgment actually exists. Id. (emphasis added); see also 
Bever, 118 Idaho at 81-82 (holding that there needs to be valid event of conviction; 
extended to areas where the Legislature did not intend the exception to apply. 
See Robinson, 143 Idaho at 310. 
In addition, the assertion in Deitz (upon which Reed relies) that I.C. § 18-8005 
was designed to encourage rehabilitation, thus putting it at odds with I.C. § 19-2604, if 
I.C. § 19-2604 is read to allow relief such as Mr. Glenn requested, is belied by the 
Legislature's stated purpose for I.C. § 18-8005: "This legislation is designed to reduce 
the number of motor vehicle drivers choosing to drive while under the influence of drugs 
and alcohol; thereby making our roads safer for law-abiding citizens." 2006 Idaho Laws 
Ch. 261 (S.B. 1397) (pp.A11-A12, infra.) It stated that it would do this only by 
increasing the permissible punishments under the statute, not by affording rehabilitative 
opportunities. Id. As such, the assertion in Deitz that both I.C. §§ 18-8005 and 19-2604 
serve the same goals is clearly erroneous, in that it is not based on substantial and 
competent evidence. See, e.g., State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 659 (2006). As such, 
the Deitz Court's purported rationale to limit the relief available pursuant to I.C. § 19-
2604 is contrary to the Legislature's stated purposes. Compare Deitz, 120 Idaho at 758 
with 2006 Idaho Laws Ch. 261 (S.B. 1397) (pp.A11-A12, infra) and 2006 Idaho Laws 
Ch. 157 (S.B. 1304) (pp.A24-A25, infra). Therefore, Reeds reliance on this erroneous 
attempt at statutory construction further demands that Reed be overruled and that 
erroneous interpretation rejected. 
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a mere charged violation of the terms of the statute is insufficient to support the 
subsequent enhancement). It is axiomatic that a non-existent judgment is not valid. 
Furthermore, other language in other sections of the Idaho Code reveal that 
I.C. § 18-8005 does not contain an exception from the relief afforded pursuant to 
I.C. § 19-2604. That is evident when I.C. § 18-8005 (pp.A7-A8, infra) is compared with 
I.C. § 19-5109(10). I.C. § 18-8005(9) (one example of many in that statute and the 
section under which Mr. Glenn was charged) reads: 
[A]ny person who has pled guilty to or has been found guilty of a felony 
violation of the provisions of section 18-8004, Idaho Code [or other 
enumerated code sections], notwithstanding the form of the judgment(s) or 
withheld judgment(s), and within fifteen (15) years pleads guilty or is found 
guilty of a further violation of the provisions of section 18-8004, Idaho 
Code, shall be guilty of a felony .... 
I.C. § 18-8005(9). However, in regard to the qualifications for membership on the 
Peace Officer Standards and Training Council, the Legislature set forth an expanded 
definition of the term "conviction": 
As used in this section, "convicted" means a plea or finding of guilt, 
notwithstanding the form of judgment or withheld judgment, regardless of 
whether the sentence is imposed, suspended, deferred or withheld, and 
regardless of whether the plea or conviction is set aside or withdrawn or 
the case is dismissed or reduced under section 19-2604, Idaho Code, or 
any other comparable statute or procedure where the setting aside of the 
plea or conviction, or dismissal or reduction of the case or charge, is 
based upon lenity or the furtherance of rehabilitation rather than upon any 
defect in the legality or factual basis of the plea, finding of guilt or 
conviction. 
I.C. § 19-5109(10) (emphasis added). This significant difference in the language 
indicates that the Legislature is not only aware of the broad relief afforded under 
I.C. § 19-2604, but that it did not intend that a similar exception exist in I.C. § 18-8005. 
See id. Had the Legislature intended I.C. § 18-8005 to have such an exception, it would 
have added language similar to that in I.C. § 19-5109(10). Because it did not, it is clear 
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that when a conviction is made non-existent pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604, it cannot serve 
as the prerequisite conviction for an enhancement under I.C. § 18-8005. 
The Court of Appeals, however, has misinterpreted the statutes to no longer 
require the valid judgment or event of conviction in the defendant's record. See Deitz, 
120 Idaho at 756-57; Perkins, 149 Idaho at 19;21 Reed, 149 Idaho at 904. Instead, all 
three decisions allow subsequent penalties to be premised on non-existent convictions 
from cases dismissed pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604. Through its misinterpretation of 
the statute, the Court of Appeals has impermissibly modified the statute to remove 
the implicit requirement that a valid judgment be present on the record. See 
State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362 (2003) (discussing the separation of powers in 
such situations, holding that it is the Legislature's province to modify statutes, not the 
Judiciary's). 
In fact, the Reed Court stated that its approach to the statute was "to ascertain 
the legislative intent and give effect to that intent. To ascertain the intent of the 
legislature, not only must the literal words of the statute be examined, but also the 
context of those words, the public policy behind the statute and its legislative 
history .... Constructions of a statute that would lead to an absurd result are 
disfavored." Reed, 149 Idaho at 904. That approach has been soundly rejected by the 
Idaho Supreme Court: "The interpretation of a statute 'must begin with the literal words 
21 The ultimate conclusion in Perkins has since been adopted by the Legislature through 
its specific amendment of the registration statute in 2006. State v. Hardwick, 150 Idaho 
580, 581 (2011); see 2006 Idaho Laws Ch. 157 (S.B. 1304) (see pp.A24-25, infra). The 
fact that the Legislature has made the promoted end valid does not, however, justify the 
rationale the Court of Appeals used to reach that conclusion. That rationale was 
contradictory to then-existing Idaho Supreme Court precedent and has, at any rate, 
been abrogated by the decision in Sharp. See Sharp, 145 Idaho at 407. 
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of the statute; those words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and 
the statute must be construed as a whole. If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court 
does not construe it, but simply follows the law as written.'" Verska, 151 Idaho at 893 
(quoting Schwartz, 139 Idaho at 362) (emphasis added). Furthermore, "where a statute 
or constitutional provision is plain, clear, and unambiguous, it 'speaks for itself and must 
be given the interpretation the language clearly implies.'" Id. (quoting Moon, 97 Idaho at 
596). The statute at issue here is not ambiguous, and thus, the Court of Appeals' desire 
to ascertain and effectuate the legislative intent is improper. 
The statutes discussed herein are clear: the conviction being relied on 
must be valid and present on the defendant's record. See, e.g., I.C. § 18-8005(9) 
("[N]otwithstanding the form of the judgment(s) or withheld judgment(s) .... ,,).22 As that 
statutory provision regarding the form of judgment is unambiguous, in that it requires a 
valid conviction on the record, the statute must be given effect as written.23 See Bever, 
22 While there may have initially been an ambiguity in regard to this language in 
I.C. § 18-8005, the Idaho Supreme Court resolved that ambiguity in Bever. the statute 
requires that valid guilty pleas or events of conviction be present in order to serve as a 
predicate for the enhancement. Bever, 118 Idaho at 82. As such, the statute is no 
longer ambiguous and there is no cause for further interpretation in that regard. 
23 In developing its position in this regard, the Court of Appeals relied on dicta from a 
1924 decision, In re France, 224 P. 433, 435 (Idaho 1924). See, e.g., Deitz, 120 Idaho 
at 757-58 (quoting France, 224 P. at 435). It attempted to apply the France rationale 
(that the statutory relief provisions that existed in 1924 were not designed to apply to 
habitual criminals) to the modern relief statutes. Deitz, 120 Idaho at 757-58. However, 
it ignored the poignant language in France: "this and other humane provisions now 
generally recognized . ... " France, 224 P. at 435 (emphasis added). The France Court 
clearly limited its ruling to then-existing statutes. Had the Legislature desired to limit the 
applicability of relief under the broader modern relief statute (I.C. § 19-2604), it would 
have included such a limitation in the language of the statute. See, e.g., Hardwick, 150 
Idaho at 581. For example, the archaic statute limited relief to only those persons 
who were under twenty-five years of age. Sharp, 145 Idaho at 407 (discussing the 
evolution of the relief statute). The modern statute, however, has no such age 
restriction. See I. C. § 19-2604 (see pp.A 18-A 19, infra). Additionally, the archaic 
statute only dealt with the trial court's ability to withhold judgment for a specific set of 
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118 Idaho at 82. The effect of the Court of Appeals' misinterpretation (essentially 
modifying the statute to eliminate that requirement) flies in the face of the constitutional 
separation of powers between the Legislature and Judiciary and is wholly inappropriate. 
See Verska, 151 Idaho at 896. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals in Reed took the 
Deitz analysis one step further, claiming any such distinction between vacated and 
outstanding withheld judgments had been eliminated. Reed, 149 Idaho at 903-04 
(without discussing Sharp and Manners). This assertion is directly contradicted by the 
Idaho Supreme Court, which obviously intended to continue to draw that distinction, or 
else it would not have used the adjective "outstanding" in its holding in Sharp. 
See Sharp, 145 Idaho at 407 ("An outstanding withheld judgment based on a guilty plea 
qualifies as a conviction under Idaho law." (emphasis added)); see also Manners, 107 
Idaho at 952 (when read with Sharp, Manners affirmatively holds that only an 
outstanding withheld judgment constitutes a conviction under Idaho law, but that a 
vacated withheld judgment and guilty plea do not). 
In fact, the Idaho Supreme Court has already rejected the Reed Court's 
conclusion that the distinction between outstanding and vacated judgments has been 
eliminated. See Bever, 118 Idaho at 81-82. In Bever, the Idaho Supreme Court held 
that there was a clear distinction between a record bearing only charged violations of 
the statute and actual convictions under the statute. Bever, 118 Idaho at 81-82. In that 
case, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the subsequent enhancement must be based 
offenses. See Sharp, 145 Idaho at 407. The modern statute applies to all offenses, 
except those which trigger I.C. § 18-8304. I.C. § 19-2604 (see pp.A 18-A 19, infra). 
Therefore, the France rationale is inapplicable to the modern relief statute, as the 
Legislature used unambiguous language to make the modern relief statute more 
broadly applicable than those in existence in 1924. As such, the Court of Appeals' 
interpretation of the statute in this regard was erroneous. 
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on a valid determination of guilt (plea of guilty or finding of guilty). Id. When read with 
Manners, the decision in Bever foreclosed the Reed Court's conclusion and established 
that there is a distinction between a vacated and outstanding judgment. See id.; 
Manners, 107 Idaho at 952. 
Instead of looking to the relevant Idaho Supreme Court precedent in Sharp, 
Bever, and Manners (among others), the Reed Court turned to its own prior decision in 
Perkins, which applied the Deitz analysis to I.C. § 18-8304(3) (A2-A3, infra), which 
addresses the requirement to register as a sex offender. Reed, 149 Idaho at 903-04 
(citing State v. Perkins, 135 Idaho 17, 21 (Ct. App. 2000)). The Court of Appeals 
concluded that the registration requirement could be based on a vacated withheld 
judgment.24 Perkins, 135 Idaho at 22. However, as the Idaho Supreme Court pointed 
out in Robinson, the reason that result was permissible was the specific language 
used in § 18-8310 (which made it the only source of relief for the registration 
requirement) and the 2006 amendment to I.C. § 19-2604 (pp.A4-A6, infra), which 
exempted the registration requirement form the relief available under that code section. 
Robinson, 143 Idaho at 310; Hardwick, 150 Idaho at 581. Notably, the fact that the 
24 As in Deitz, one member of the Perkins Court reminded the majority of the actual 
effect of a complete setting aside of the guilty plea underlying the withheld judgment. 
Perkins, 135 Idaho at 22-23 (Schwartzman, J., specially concurring). Judge 
Schwartzman pointed out that the district court in Perkins had not actually set aside 
the defendant's guilty plea and only conditionally dismissed the case. Id. at 22. 
Judge Schwartzman then highlighted the inherent difference between that result and a 
complete dismissal of the case (including setting aside the guilty plea), and stated 
that, in the latter situation (based on the statute before the 2006 amendments 
(see pp.A24-A27, infra)), even the registration requirement could not be based on the 
non-existent prior dismissed judgment because of the language of the statute at that 
time. Id. at 22-23. The hypothetical situation Judge Schwartzman presented in his 
special concurrence is identical to the facts in Mr. Glenn's case, further illustrating the 
impropriety of relying on his non-existent withheld judgment to justify the subsequent 
punishment. (See R., pp.77-79.) 
30 
Legislature found it necessary to add the exemption into I.C. § 19-2604, despite the 
presence of the "notwithstanding the form of the judgment(s) or withheld judgment(s)" 
language in I.C. § 18-8304 and the Court of Appeals' 2000 decision in Perkins, indicates 
that, in fact, the Legislature believed I.C. § 19-2604 offered relief which would 
nullify prior convictions to the point that they could not be prerequisites to subsequent 
deprivations of civil rights, including the sex offender registration requirement. Hence, 
its decision to amend the statute to exempt the registration requirement from the relief 
afforded by I. C. § 19-2604. This further reveals the error in the Reed Court's analysis of 
the statutes in question. See Reed, 149 Idaho at 903-04. 
Finally, the Reed Court looked to its own prior decision in State v. Woodbury, to 
justify its conclusion. Reed, 149 Idaho at 904 (citing State v. Woodbury, 141 Idaho 547, 
549 (Ct. App. 2005)). In its dicta in Woodbury, the Court of Appeals had expanded the 
rationale it established in Deitz to other situations besides those previously identified, 
including sentencing enhancement in domestic violence cases, and disqualifications for 
concealed weapons or liquor licenses. Woodbury, 141 Idaho at 549. The Woodbury 
Court did not discuss the contradictory Idaho Supreme Court decision in Manners, 
which explicitly held that a license (specifically a veterinary license) could not be 
revoked based on a non-existent conviction, one vacated under I. C. § 19-2604 
(which also suggests that a license could not be denied based on a non-existent 
conviction). See Woodbury, 141 Idaho at 548; compare Manners, 107 Idaho at 952. 
The Court of Appeals also stated that convictions vacated pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604 
could still serve as the prerequisite felony for enhanced punishments for DUI offenses, 
even though the Idaho Supreme Court stated in Bever that there needed to be a 
valid event of conviction or valid guilty plea present for that to be permissible. 
31 
See Woodbury, 141 Idaho at 548; compare Bever, 118 Idaho at 82. As such, the dicta 
from Woodbury, upon which the Reed Court relied, is clearly preempted by Idaho 
Supreme Court precedent, further illustrating why Reed should be overruled. 
Therefore, because the Court of Appeals' decision in Reed is clearly contradicted 
by several Idaho Supreme Court cases, it should be overruled. Compare, e.g., Sharp, 
145 Idaho at 407; Parkinson, 144 Idaho at 828; Robinson, 143 Idaho at 310; Manners, 
107 Idaho at 952; BalWick, 94 Idaho at 143; with, e.g., Reed, 149 Idaho at 904. And 
because the order denying Mr. Glenn's motion to dismiss was premised on the decision 
in Reed (R., pp.77-79), that order should be reversed as well, and Mr. Glenn's case 
should be remanded for further proceedings. 
To that end, Mr. Glenn's motion should be granted because the statute is 
unambiguous (see Verska, 151 Idaho at 896), as has been established by the Idaho 
Supreme Court's clear precedent: when the withheld judgment is not outstanding, but 
has instead been vacated and the underlying guilty plea withdrawn, they cannot be 
the basis for a subsequent penalty because, once vacated and withdrawn, they are 
non-existent throughout the history of the case. Sharp, 145 Idaho at 407; Parkinson, 
144 Idaho at 828; Robinson, 143 Idaho at 310; Manners, 107 Idaho at 952; BalWick, 94 
Idaho at 143. Mr. Glenn's guilty plea was withdrawn and his withheld judgment 
dismissed in its entirety. (R., p.46.) As such, based on the Idaho Supreme Court 
precedent on point, it cannot be the basis for a subsequent sentence enhancement, and 
the district court's decision allowing it to be so is in error. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Glenn respectfully requests that this Court overrule Reed, reverse the district 
court's order denying his motion to dismiss, and remand his case for further 
proceedings. 
DATED this 26th day of September, 20~. / / 
// f / 
/~ // / . / // _____ / { J // / '-___ 
BRIAN R. DICKSON
v 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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I. C. § 18-8304 
§ 18-8304. Application of chapter--rulemaking authority 
(1) The provisions of this chapter shall apply to any person who: 
(a) On or after July 1, 1993, is convicted of the crime, or an attempt, a solicitation, or 
a conspiracy to commit a crime provided for in section 18-909 (assault with intent to 
commit rape, infamous crime against nature, or lewd and lascivious conduct with a 
minor, but excluding mayhem, murder or robbery), 18-911 (battery with intent to 
commit rape, infamous crime against nature, or lewd and lascivious conduct with a 
minor, but excluding mayhem, murder or robbery), 18-919 (sexual exploitation by a 
medical care provider), 18-15058 (sexual abuse and exploitation of a vulnerable 
ad ult), 18-1506 (sexual abuse of a child under sixteen years of age), 18-1506A 
(ritualized abuse of a child), 18-1507 (sexual exploitation of a child), 18-1508 (lewd 
conduct with a minor child), 18-1508A (sexual battery of a minor child sixteen or 
seventeen years of age), 18-1509A (enticing a child over the internet), 18-4003(d) 
(murder committed in perpetration of rape), 18-4116 (indecent exposure, but 
excluding a misdemeanor conviction), 18-4502 (first degree kidnapping committed 
for the purpose of rape, committing the infamous crime against nature or for 
committing any lewd and lascivious act upon any child under the age of sixteen, or 
for purposes of sexual gratification or arousal), 18-4503 (second degree kidnapping 
where the victim is an unrelated minor child), 18-5605 (detention for prostitution), 18-
5609 (inducing person under eighteen years of age into prostitution), 18-5611 
(inducing person under eighteen years of age to patronize a prostitute), 18-6101 
(rape, but excluding 18-6101(1) where the defendant is eighteen years of age), 18-
6108 (male rape, but excluding 18-6108(1) where the defendant is eighteen years of 
age), 18-6110 (sexual contact with a prisoner), 18-6602 (incest), 18-6605 (crime 
against nature), 18-6608 (forcible sexual penetration by use of a foreign object), 18-
6609 (video voyeurism where the victim is a minor or upon a second or subsequent 
conviction), 18-7804 (if the racketeering act involves kidnapping of a minor) or 18-
8602(1), Idaho Code, (sex trafficking). 
(b) On or after July 1, 1993, has been convicted of any crime, an attempt, a 
solicitation or a conspiracy to commit a crime in another jurisdiction or who has a 
foreign conviction that is substantially equivalent to the offenses listed in subsection 
(1 )(a) of this section and enters this state to establish residence or for employment 
purposes or to attend, on a full-time or part-time basis, any public or private 
educational institution including any secondary school, trade or professional 
institution or institution of higher education. 
(c) Has been convicted of any crime, an attempt, a solicitation or a conspiracy to 
commit a crime in another jurisdiction, including military courts, that is substantially 
equivalent to the offenses listed in subsection (1 )(a) of this section and was required 
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to register as a sex offender in any other state or jurisdiction when he established 
residency in Idaho. 
(d) Pleads guilty to or has been found guilty of a crime covered in this chapter prior 
to July 1, 1993, and the person, as a result of the offense, is incarcerated in a county 
jail facility or a penal facility or is under probation or parole supervision, on or after 
July 1, 1993. 
(e) Is a nonresident regularly employed or working in Idaho or is a student in the 
state of Idaho and was convicted, found guilty or pleaded guilty to a crime covered 
by this chapter and, as a result of such conviction, finding or plea, is required to 
register in his state of residence. 
(2) An offender shall not be required to comply with the registration provisions of this 
chapter while incarcerated in a correctional institution of the department of correction, a 
county jail facility, committed to the department of juvenile corrections or committed to a 
mental health institution of the department of health and welfare. 
(3) A conviction for purposes of this chapter means that the person has pled guilty or 
has been found guilty, notwithstanding the form of the judgment or withheld judgment. 
(4) The department shall have authority to promulgate rules to implement the provisions 
of this chapter. 
Credits 
S.L. 1998, ch. 411, § 2; S.L. 1999, ch. 302, § 1; S.L. 1999, ch. 349, § 2; S.L. 2001, ch. 
194, § 2; S.L. 2003, ch. 145, § 2; S.L. 2004, ch. 122, § 2; S.L. 2005, ch. 233, § 1; S.L. 
2006, ch. 408, § 1, eff. July 1, 2006; S.L. 2009, ch. 250, § 2, eff. July 1, 2009. Amended 
by S.L. 2010, ch. 352, § 7, eff. July 1, 2010; S.L. 2011, ch. 27, § 2, eff. July 1, 2011; 
S.L. 2011, ch. 311, § 3, eff. July 1, 2011; S.L. 2012, ch. 269, § 4, eff. July 1, 2012; S.L. 
2012, ch. 271, § 1, eff. July 1, 2012. 
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2006 Idaho Laws Ch. 408 (S.B. 1425) 
IDAHO 2006 SESSION LAWS 
SECOND REGULAR SESSION OF THE 59TH LEGISLATURE 
Additions are indicated by Text; deletions by 
~. Changes in tables are made but not highlighted. 
Vetoed provisions within tabular material are not displayed. 
Ch.408 
S.B. No. 1425 
CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT-SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION 
AN ACT RELATING TO THE SEXUAL OFFENDER REGISTRATION NOTIFICATION 
AND COMMUNITY RIGHTTO-KNOWACT; AMENDING SECTION 18-8304, IDAHO 
CODE, TO EXEMPT FROM REPORTING REQUIREMENTS CERTAIN DEFENDANTS 
CONVICTED OF STATUTORY RAPE AND TO MAKE A TECHNICAL CORRECTION. 
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho: 
SECTION 1. That Section 18-8304, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby 
amended to read as follows: 
« ID ST § 18-8304 » 
§ 18-8304. Application of chapter 
(1) The provisions of this chapter shall apply to any person who: 
(a) On or after July 1, 1993, is convicted of the crime, or an attempt, a solicitation, or 
a conspiracy to commit a crime provided for in section 18-909 (assault with attempt 
to commit rape, infamous crime against nature, or lewd and lascivious conduct with 
a minor, but excluding mayhem, murder or robbery), 18-911 (battery with attempt to 
commit rape, infamous crime against nature, or lewd and lascivious conduct with a 
minor, but excluding mayhem, murder or robbery), 18-1506 (sexual abuse of a child 
under sixteen years of age), 18-1506A (ritualized abuse of a child), 18-1507 (sexual 
exploitation of a child), 18-1507 A (possession of sexually exploitative material for 
other than a commercial purpose), 18-1508 (lewd conduct with a minor child), 18-
1508A (sexual battery of a minor child sixteen or seventeen years of age), 18-
1509A (enticing a child over the internet), 18-4003(d) (murder committed in 
perpetration of rape), 18-4116 (indecent exposure, but excluding a misdemeanor 
conviction), 18-4502 (first degree kidnapping committed for the purpose of rape, 
committing the infamous crime against nature or for committing any lewd and 
lascivious act upon any child under the age of sixteen, or for purposes of sexual 
gratification or arousal), 18-4503 (second degree kidnapping where the victim is an 
unrelated minor child), 18-6101 (rape, but excluding 18-6101 f1j . where the 
defendant is eighteen years of age or younger or where the defendant is exempted 
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under subsection (4) of this section), 18-6108 (male rape), 18-6110 (sexual contact 
with a prisoner), 18-6602 (incest), 18-6605 (crime against nature), 18-6608 
(forcible sexual penetration by use of a foreign object), or upon a second or 
subsequent conviction under 18-6609, Idaho Code (video voyeurism). 
(b) On or after July 1, 1993, has been convicted of any crime, an attempt, a 
solicitation or a conspiracy to commit a crime in another state, territory, 
commonwealth, or other jurisdiction of the United States, including tribal courts and 
military courts, that is substantially equivalent to the offenses listed in subsection 
(1 )(a) of this section and enters the state to establish permanent or temporary 
residence. 
(c) Has been convicted of any crime, an attempt, a solicitation or a conspiracy to 
commit a crime in another state, territory, commonwealth, or other jurisdiction of the 
United States, including tribal courts and military courts, that is substantially 
equivalent to the offenses listed in subsection (1 )(a) of this section and was required 
to register as a sex offender in any other state or jurisdiction when he established 
permanent or temporary residency in Idaho. 
(d) Pleads guilty to or has been found guilty of a crime covered in this chapter prior 
to July 1, 1993, and the person, as a result of the offense, is incarcerated in a county 
jail facility or a penal facility or is under probation or parole supervision, on or after 
July 1, 1993. 
(e) Is a nonresident regularly employed or working in Idaho or is a student in the 
state of Idaho and was convicted, found guilty or pleaded guilty to a crime covered 
by this chapter and, as a result of such conviction, finding or plea, is required to 
register in his state of residence. 
(2) The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to any such person while the person is 
incarcerated in a correctional institution of the department of correction, a county jail 
facility or committed to a mental health institution of the department of health and 
welfare. 
(3) A conviction for purposes of this chapter means that the person has pled guilty or 
has been found guilty, notwithstanding the form of the judgment or withheld judgment. 
(4) When a defendant is convicted of rape under section 18-6101 1., Idaho Code, and 
at the time of the offense the defendant is nineteen (19) or twenty (20) years of age and 
not more than three (3) years older than the victim of the rape, the court may order that 
the defendant is exempt from the requirements of this chapter upon a finding by the 
court that: 
(a) All parties have stipulated to the exemption; or 
(b) The defendant has demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that he is not 
a risk to commit another crime identified in subsection (1) of this section and in the 
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case there were no allegations by the victim of any violation of section 18-6101 2. 
through 7., Idaho Code. 
Approved on the 10th day of April, 2006. 
Effective: July 1, 2006. 
Statement of Purpose 
RS16129 
The purpose of this legislation is to allow an exemption for people accused of statutory 
rape to avoid the sex offender registry. The exemption would only apply to defendants 
nineteen or twenty years of age who are not more than three years older than the 
victim. 
Fiscal Note 
There is no fiscal impact. 
Contact Name: Senator Denton Darrington 
Phone: (208) 332-1317 
Name: Representative Debbie Field 
Phone: (208) 332-1127 
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I.C. § 18-8005 
§ 18-8005. Penalties 
(4) Any person who pleads guilty to or is found guilty of a violation of the provisions of 
section 18-8004(1 )(a), (b) or (c), Idaho Code, who previously has been found guilty of or 
has pled guilty to a violation of the provisions of section 18-8004(1 )(a), (b) or (c), Idaho 
Code, or any substantially conforming foreign criminal violation within ten (10) years, 
notwithstanding the form of the judgment(s) or withheld judgment(s), and except as 
provided in section 18-8004C, Idaho Code, is guilty of a misdemeanor; and, except as 
provided in section 18-8004C, Idaho Code: 
(a) Shall be sentenced to jail for a mandatory minimum period of not less than ten 
(10) days the first forty-eight (48) hours of which must be consecutive, and five (5) 
days of which must be served in jail, as required by 23 U.S.C. section 164, and may 
be sentenced to not more than one (1) year, provided however, that in the discretion 
of the sentencing judge, the judge may authorize the defendant to be assigned to a 
work detail program within the custody of the county sheriff during the period of 
incarceration; 
(b) May be fined an amount not to exceed two thousand dollars ($2,000); 
(c) Shall be advised by the court in writing at the time of sentencing, of the penalties 
that will be imposed for subsequent violations of the provisions of section 18-8004, 
Idaho Code, which advice shall be signed by the defendant, and a copy retained by 
the court and another copy retained by the prosecuting attorney; 
(d) Shall surrender his driver's license or permit to the court; 
(e) Shall have his driving privileges suspended by the court for an additional 
mandatory minimum period of one (1) year after release from confinement, during 
which one (1) year period absolutely no driving privileges of any kind may be 
granted; and 
(f) Shall, while operating a motor vehicle, be required to drive only a motor vehicle 
equipped with a functioning ignition interlock system, as provided in section 18-8008, 
Idaho Code, following the one (1) year mandatory license suspension period. 
(6) Except as provided in section 18-8004C, Idaho Code, any person who pleads guilty 
to or is found guilty of a violation of the provisions of section 18-8004(1 )(a), (b) or (c), 
Idaho Code, who previously has been found guilty of or has pled guilty to two (2) or 
more violations of the provisions of section 18-8004(1 )(a), (b) or (c), Idaho Code, or any 
substantially conforming foreign criminal violation, or any combination thereof, within ten 
(10) years, notwithstanding the form of the judgment(s) or withheld judgment(s), shall be 
guilty of a felony; and 
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(a) Shall be sentenced to the custody of the state board of correction for not to 
exceed ten (10) years; provided that notwithstanding the provisions of section 19-
2601, Idaho Code, should the court impose any sentence other than incarceration in 
the state penitentiary, the defendant shall be sentenced to the county jail for a 
mandatory minimum period of not less than thirty (30) days, the first forty-eight (48) 
hours of which must be consecutive, and ten (10) days of which must be served in 
jail, as required by 23 U.S.C. section 164; and further provided that notwithstanding 
the provisions of section 18-111, Idaho Code, a conviction under this section shall 
be deemed a felony; 
(b) May be fined an amount not to exceed five thousand dollars ($5,000); 
(c) Shall surrender his driver's license or permit to the court; 
(d) Shall have his driving privileges suspended by the court for a mandatory 
minimum period of one (1) year after release from imprisonment, and may have his 
driving privileges suspended by the court for not to exceed five (5) years after 
release from imprisonment, during which time he shall have absolutely no driving 
privileges of any kind; and 
(e) Shall, while operating a motor vehicle, be required to drive only a motor vehicle 
equipped with a functioning ignition interlock system, as provided in section 18-8008, 
Idaho Code, following the mandatory one (1) year license suspension period. 
(9) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (4) and (6) of this section, any person 
who has pled guilty or has been found guilty of a felony violation of the provisions of 
section 18-8004, Idaho Code, a felony violation of the provisions of section 18-8004C, 
Idaho Code, a violation of the provisions of section 18-8006, Idaho Code, a violation of 
the provisions of section 18-4006 3.(b), Idaho Code, notwithstanding the form of the 
judgment(s) or withheld judgment(s) or any substantially conforming foreign criminal 
felony violation, notwithstanding the form of the judgment(s) or withheld judgment(s), 
and within fifteen (15) years pleads guilty or is found guilty of a further violation of the 
provisions of section 18-8004, Idaho Code, shall be guilty of a felony and shall be 
sentenced pursuant to subsection (6) of this section. 
Credits 
S.L. 1984, ch. 22, § 2; S.L. 1986, ch. 201, § 1; S.L. 1988, ch. 265, § 564; S.L. 1989, ch. 
88, § 62; S.L. 1989, ch. 175, § 1; S.L. 1989, ch. 366, § 2; S.L. 1990, ch. 45, § 45; S.L. 
1992, ch. 115, § 40; S.L. 1992, ch. 139, § 1; S.L. 1992, ch. 338, § 1; S.L. 1993, ch. 272, 
§ 1; S.L. 1994, ch. 148, § 2; S.L. 1994, ch. 421, § 2; S.L. 1994, ch. 422, § 3; S.L. 1997, 
ch. 114, § 1; S.L. 1999, ch. 80, § 2; S.L. 2000, ch. 240, § 1; S.L. 2000, ch. 247, § 3; S.L. 
2003, ch. 286, § 1; S.L. 2005, ch. 352, § 3; S.L. 2006, ch. 261, § 3, eff. July 1, 2006; 
S.L. 2009, ch. 11, § 6, eff. July 1, 2009; S.L. 2009, ch. 184, § 5, eff. July 1, 2009. 
Amended by S.L. 2010, ch. 331, § 1, eff. July 1, 2010; S.L. 2011, ch. 265, § 4, eff. Jan. 
1, 2012. 
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Ch.261 
S.B. No. 1397 
CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT-INCREASED PENALTIES FOR REPEAT DUI 
VIOLATORS 
AN ACT RELATING TO DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF INTOXICATING 
SUBSTANCES; AMENDING SECTION 18-8002, IDAHO CODE, TO INCREASE 
PENALTIES AND TO INCREASE THE PERIOD OF TIME APPLICABLE TO REPEAT 
REFUSALS TO EVIDENTIARY TESTING; AMENDING SECTION 18-8002A, IDAHO 
CODE, TO REVISE INFORMATION TO BE GIVEN TO PERSONS SUBJECT TO 
EVIDENTIARY TESTING; AMENDING SECTION 18-8005, IDAHO CODE, TO 
PROVIDE CLARIFYING LANGUAGE, TO INCREASE THE PERIOD OF TIME 
APPLICABLE TO REPEAT VIOLATIONS AND TO INCREASE PENALTIES; AND 
AMENDING SECTION 18-8006, IDAHO CODE, TO INCREASE A PENALTY. 
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho: 
SECTION 3. That Section 18-8005, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby amended 
to read as follows: 
« 10 ST § 18-8005 » 
§ 18-8005. Penalties 
(4) Any person who pleads guilty to or is found guilty of a violation of the provisions of 
section 18-8004(1 )(a), (b) or (c), Idaho Code, who previously has been found guilty of 
or has pled guilty to a violation of the provisions of section 18-8004(1 )(a), (b) or (c), 
Idaho Code, or any substantially conforming foreign criminal violation within fi¥e ten (5 
10) years, notwithstanding the form of the judgment(s) or withheld judgment(s), and 
except as provided in section 18-8004C, Idaho Code, is guilty of a misdemeanor; and, 
except as provided in section 18-8004C, Idaho Code: 
(a) Shall be sentenced to jail for a mandatory minimum period of not less than ten 
(10) days the first forty-eight (48) hours of which must be consecutive, and five (5) 
days of which must be served in jail, as required by 23 U.S.C. section 164, and may 
be sentenced to not more than one (1) year, provided however, that in the discretion 
of the sentencing judge, the judge may authorize the defendant to be assigned to a 
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work detail program within the custody of the county sheriff during the period of 
incarceration; 
(b) May be fined an amount not to exceed two thousand dollars ($2,000); 
(c) Shall be advised by the court in writing at the time of sentencing, of the penalties 
that will be imposed for subsequent violations of the provisions of section 1B-B004, 
Idaho Code, which advice shall be signed by the defendant, and a copy retained by 
the court and another copy retained by the prosecuting attorney; 
(d) Shall surrender his driver's license or permit to the court; 
(e) Shall have his driving privileges suspended by the court for an additional 
mandatory minimum period of one (1) year after release from confinement, during 
which one (1) year period absolutely no driving privileges of any kind may be 
granted; and 
(f) Shall, while operating a motor vehicle, be required to drive only a motor vehicle 
equipped with a functioning ignition interlock system, as provided in section 1B-
800B, Idaho Code, following the one (1) year mandatory license suspension period. 
(g) If the person has pled guilty or was found guilty for the second time within five ten 
(a 10) years of a violation of the provisions of section 1B-B004(1)(b) or (c), Idaho 
Code, then the provisions of section 49-335, Idaho Code, shall apply. 
(5) Except as provided in section 1B-B004C, Idaho Code, any person who pleads guilty 
to or is found guilty of a violation of the provisions of section 1B-B004(1)(a), (b) or (c), 
Idaho Code, who previously has been found guilty of or has pled guilty to two (2) or 
more violations of the provisions of section 1B-B004(1)(a), (b) or (c), Idaho Code, or any 
substantially conforming foreign criminal violation, or any combination thereof, within 
five ten (a10)years, notwithstanding the form of the judgment(s) or withheld 
judgment(s), shall be guilty of a felony; and 
(a) Shall be sentenced to the custody of the state board of correction for not to 
exceed five ten (a 10)years; provided that notwithstanding the provisions of section 
19-2601, Idaho Code, should the court impose any sentence other than 
incarceration in the state penitentiary, the defendant shall be sentenced to the 
county jail for a mandatory minimum period of not less than thirty (30) days, the first 
forty-eight (4B) hours of which must be consecutive, and ten (10) days of which must 
be served in jail, as required by 23 U.S.C. section 164; and further provided that 
notwithstanding the provisions of section 1B-111, Idaho Code, a conviction under 
this section shall be deemed a felony; 
(b) May be fined an amount not to exceed five thousand dollars ($5,000); 
(c) Shall surrender his driver's license or permit to the court; and 
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(d) Shall have his driving privileges suspended by the court for a mandatory 
minimum perod of one (1) year after release from imprisonment, and may have his 
driving privileges suspended by the court for not to exceed five (5) years after 
release from imprisonment, during which time he shall have absolutely no driving 
privileges of any kind; and 
(e) Shall, while operating a motor vehicle, be required to drive only a motor vehicle 
equipped with a functioning ignition interlock system, as provided in section 18-
8008, Idaho Code, following the mandatory one (1) year license suspension period. 
(6) For the purpose of computation of the enhancement period in subsections (4), (5) 
and (7) of this section, the time that elapses between the date of commission of the 
offense and the date the defendant pleads guilty or is found guilty for the pending 
offense shall be excluded. If the determination of guilt against the defendant is reversed 
upon appeal, the time that elapsed between the date of the commission of the offense 
and the date the defendant pleads guilty or is found guilty following the appeal shall also 
be excluded. 
(7) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (4) and (5) of this section, any person 
who has pled guilty or has been found guilty of a felony violation of the provisions of 
section 18-8004, Idaho Code, a felony violation of the provisions of section 18-8004C, 
Idaho Code, a violation of the provisions of section 18-8006, Idaho Code, a violation of 
the provisions of section 18-4006 3.(b), Idaho Code, or any substantially conforming 
foreign criminal felony violation, and within tefl fifteen (1 () 5) years pleads guilty or is 
found guilty of a further violation of the provisions of section 18-8004, Idaho Code, shall 
be guilty of a felony and shall be sentenced pursuant to subsection (5) of this section. 
Approved on the 30th day of March, 2006. 
Effective: July 1, 2006. 
Statement of Purpose 
RS15920 
This legislation is designed to reduce the number of motor vehicle drivers 
choosing to drive while under the influence of drugs and alcohol; thereby making our 
roads safer for law-abiding citizens. Specifically this legislation accomplishes two things: 
1. Drivers pulled-over by law enforcement officials for suspected DUI who refuse to 
provide specimens for evidentiary testing: The legislation increases the potential 
administrative license suspension from 180 days to one year for the first refusal and 
from one year to two years for a second or more refusals within ten (increased from 
five) years. 
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2. For multiple DUI offenders: The legislation increases the maximum sentence a judge 
may impose upon conviction for a felony DUI from five years, not to exceed to ten years 
and for aggravated DUI from ten years to fifteen years. In addition, this legislation 
increases the time period for charging a subsequent enhanced DUI from five years to 
10 years and a felony from 10 years to fifteen years. 
Fiscal Note 
The fiscal impact cannot be determined as it depends on the future number of 
violators and the exact ruling of the courts in each case. It is likely that there will be an 
increase in the number of DUI violators that will be impacted by this legislation. 
Accordingly, this legislation will likely have the fiscal effect of increasing the costs of 
local and state law enforcement, prosecution, jail, courts and prisons. However, it will 
likely have a positive fiscal impact because it should decrease citizen and taxpayer 
costs associated with the injury and death of our law-abiding citizens as they travel on 
our roads. 
Contact Persons: 
Representative Rich Wills (208-332-1218 [sic] 
Senator Hal Bunderson, (208) 332-1320 
Heather Riley, Idaho Prosecuting Attorneys (208) 287-7700 
Mike Kane, Idaho Sheriffs Association (208) 342-4545 
Aleshea Lind, MADD (208) 853-3700 
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I.C. § 19-2601 
§ 19-2601. Commutation, suspension, withholding of sentence--Probation 
Whenever any person shall have been convicted, or enter a plea of guilty, in any district 
court of the state of Idaho, of or to any crime against the laws of the state, except those 
of treason or murder, the court in its discretion, may: 
1. Commute the sentence and confine the defendant in the county jail, or, if the 
defendant is of proper age, commit the defendant to the custody of the state department 
of juvenile corrections; or 
2. Suspend the execution of the judgment at the time of judgment or at any time during 
the term of a sentence in the county jail and place the defendant on probation under 
such terms and conditions as it deems necessary and expedient; or 
3. Withhold judgment on such terms and for such time as it may prescribe and may 
place the defendant on probation; or 
4. Suspend the execution of the judgment at any time during the first three hundred 
sixty-five (365) days of a sentence to the custody of the state board of correction. The 
court shall retain jurisdiction over the prisoner for a period of up to the first three 
hundred sixty-five (365) days or, if the prisoner is a juvenile, until the juvenile reaches 
twenty-one (21) years of age. During the period of retained jurisdiction, the state board 
of correction shall be responsible for determining the placement of the prisoner and 
such education, programming and treatment as it determines to be appropriate. The 
prisoner will remain committed to the board of correction if not affirmatively placed on 
probation by the court. In extraordinary circumstances, where the court concludes that it 
is unable to obtain and evaluate the relevant information within the period of retained 
jurisdiction, or where the court concludes that a hearing is required and is unable to 
obtain the defendant's presence for such a hearing within such period, the court may 
decide whether to place the defendant on probation or release jurisdiction within a 
reasonable time, not to exceed thirty (30) days, after the period of retained jurisdiction 
has expired. Placement on probation shall be under such terms and conditions as the 
court deems necessary and expedient. The court in its discretion may sentence a 
defendant to more than one (1) period of retained jurisdiction after a defendant has 
been placed on probation in a case. In no case shall the board of correction or its agent, 
the department of correction, be required to hold a hearing of any kind with respect to a 
recommendation to the court for the grant or denial of probation. Probation is a matter 
left to the sound discretion of the court. Any recommendation made by the department 
to the court regarding the prisoner shall be in the nature of an addendum to the 
presentence report. The board of correction and its agency, the department of 
correction, and their employees shall not be held financially responsible for damages, 
injunctive or declaratory relief for any recommendation made to the district court under 
this section. 
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5. If the crime involved is a felony and if judgment is withheld as provided in 
subsection 3. of this section or if judgment and a sentence of custody to the state board 
of correction is suspended at the time of judgment in accordance with subsection 2. of 
this section or as provided by subsection 4. of this section and the court shall place the 
defendant upon probation, it shall be to the board of correction, to a county juvenile 
probation department, or any other person or persons the court, in its discretion, deems 
appropriate. 
6. If the crime involved is a misdemeanor, indictable or otherwise, or if the court should 
suspend any remaining portion of a jail sentence already commuted in accordance with 
subsection 1. of this section, the court, if it grants probation, may place the defendant on 
probation. If the convicted person is a juvenile held for adult criminal proceedings, the 
court may order probation under the supervision of the county's juvenile probation 
department. 
7. The period of probation ordered by a court under this section under a conviction or 
plea of guilty for a misdemeanor, indictable or otherwise, may be for a period of not 
more than two (2) years; provided that the court may extend the period of probation to 
include the period of time during which the defendant is a participant in a problem 
solving court program and for a period of up to one (1) year after a defendant's 
graduation or termination from a problem solving court program. Under a conviction or 
plea of guilty for a felony the period of probation may be for a period of not more than 
the maximum period for which the defendant might have been imprisoned. 
Credits 
S.L. 1972, ch. 336, § 9; S.L. 1972, ch. 381, § 16; S.L. 1973, ch. 292, § 1; S.L. 1974, ch. 
68, § 1; S.L. 1980, ch. 176, § 1; S.L. 1994, ch. 33, § 1; S.L. 1995, ch. 247, § 1; S.L. 
1996, ch. 418, § 1; S.L. 1998, ch. 67, § 1; S.L. 2000, ch. 246, § 1; S.L. 2005, ch. 186, § 
1. Amended by S.L. 2010, ch. 350, § 1, eft. July 1,2010; S.L. 2012, ch. 46, § 1, eft. July 
1,2012. 
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Ch.186 
H.B. No. 204 
COURTS-JURISDICTION 
AN ACT RELATING TO COURT JURISDICTION; AMENDING SECTION 19-2601, 
IDAHO CODE, TO PROVIDE THAT UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES THE 
COURT MAY DECIDE WHETHER TO PLACE A DEFENDANT ON PROBATION OR 
RELEASE JURISDICTION WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME AFTER THE ONE 
HUNDRED EIGHTY DAY PERIOD OF RETAINED JURISDICTION HAS EXPIRED. 
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho: 
SECTION 1. That Section 19-2601, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby amended 
to read as follows: 
« 10 ST § 19-2601 » 
19-2601. COMMUTATION, SUSPENSION, WITHHOLDING OF SENTENCE -
PROBATION. 
Whenever any person shall have been convicted, or enter a plea of guilty, in any district 
court of the state of Idaho, of or to any crime against the laws of the state, except those 
of treason or murder, the court in its discretion, may: 
1. Commute the sentence and confine the defendant in the county jail, or, if the 
defendant is of proper age, commit the defendant to the custody of the state department 
of juvenile corrections; or 
2. Suspend the execution of the judgment at the time of judgment or at any time during 
the term of a sentence in the county jail and place the defendant on probation under 
such terms and conditions as it deems necessary and expedient; or 
3. Withhold judgment on such terms and for such time as it may prescribe and may 
place the defendant on probation; or 
4. Suspend the execution of the judgment at any time during the first one hundred 
eighty (180) days of a sentence to the custody of the state board of correction. The 
court shall retain jurisdiction over the prisoner for the first one hundred eighty (180) days 
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or, if the prisoner is a juvenile, until the juvenile reaches twenty-one (21) years of age. 
The prisoner will remain committed to the board of correction if not affirmatively placed 
on probation by the court. In extraordinary circumstances, where the court concludes 
that it is unable to obtain and evaluate the relevant information within the one hundred 
eighty (180) day period of retained jurisdiction, or where the court concludes that a 
hearing is required and is unable to obtain the defendant's presence for such a hearing 
within such period, the court may decide whether to place the defendant on probation or 
release jurisdiction within a reasonable time, not to exceed thirty (30) days, after the one 
hundred eighty (180) day period of retained jurisdiction has expired. Placement on 
probation shall be under such terms and conditions as the court deems necessary and 
expedient. The court in its discretion may sentence a defendant to more than one (1) 
period of retained jurisdiction after a defendant has been placed on probation in a case. 
In no case shall the board of correction or its agent, the department of correction, be 
required to hold a hearing of any kind with respect to a recommendation to the court for 
the grant or denial of probation. Probation is a matter left to the sound discretion of the 
court. Any recommendation made by the department to the court regarding the prisoner 
shall be in the nature of an addendum to the presentence report. The board of 
correction and its agency, the department of correction, and their employees shall not 
be held financially responsible for damages, injunctive or declaratory relief for any 
recommendation made to the district court under this section. 
5. If the crime involved is a felony and if judgment is withheld as provided in 
subsection 3. of this section or if judgment and a sentence of custody to the state board 
of correction is suspended at the time of judgment in accordance with subsection 2. of 
this section or as provided by subsection 4. of this section and the court shall place the 
defendant upon probation, it shall be to the board of correction, to a county juvenile 
probation department, or any other person or persons the court, in its discretion, deems 
appropriate. 
6. If the crime involved is a misdemeanor, indictable or otherwise, or if the court should 
suspend any remaining portion of a jail sentence already commuted in accordance with 
subsection 1. of this section, the court, if it grants probation, may place the defendant on 
probation. If the convicted person is a juvenile held for adult criminal proceedings, the 
court may order probation under the supervision of the county's juvenile probation 
department. 
7. The period of probation ordered by a court under this section under a conviction or 
plea of guilty for a misdemeanor, indictable or otherwise, may be for a period of not 
more than two (2) years; and under a conviction or plea of guilty for a felony the period 
of probation may be for a period of not more than the maximum period for which the 
defendant might have been imprisoned. 
Approved on the 28th day of March, 2005. 
Effective: July 1, 2005. 
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Statement of Pu rpose 
RS14873 
This bill is intended to resolve the uncertainty that now exists as to when a 
sentencing court can make a decision as to whether to place a defendant on probation 
following a period of retained jurisdiction. 
Idaho Code § 19-2601 (4) provides that a sentencing court can retain jurisdiction 
over a defendant for 180 days, and that at any time during that period the court may 
place the defendant on probation. In State v. Diggie, 140 Idaho 238, 91 P.3d 1142 (Ct. 
App. 2004), the Court of Appeals reaffirmed that a sentencing court loses jurisdiction 
over a defendant and may no longer place the defendant on probation when the 180-
day period expires. The Court went on to say, however, "We deem it unnecessary to 
hold in this case that a sentencing court may never make a decision to place a 
defendant on probation within a reasonable time after the 180-day period of retained 
jurisdiction has expired where extraordinary circumstances exist that may explain or 
justify court action beyond the statutorily established period." 91 P.3d at 1145. 
This bill would provide that a court that has retained jurisdiction may place a 
defendant on probation after the 180-day period has expired only where extraordinary 
circumstances exist that prevent the court from obtaining needed information or 
securing the defendant's presence for a hearing. Even then, the 180-day period could 
be extended only for 30 days. This would resolve the existing uncertainty in the law and 
provide some leeway for sentencing courts in the small number of cases where such 
extraordinary circumstances are present. 
Fiscal Note 
This bill would have no impact on the general fund. 
Contact Person: 
Patricia Tobias Administrative Director of the Courts (208) 334-2246 
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I.C. § 19-2604 
§ 19-2604. Discharge of defendant--Amendment of judgment 
(1) If sentence has been imposed but suspended, or if sentence has been withheld, 
upon application of the defendant and upon satisfactory showing that: 
(a) The court did not find, and the defendant did not admit, in any probation violation 
proceeding that the defendant violated any of the terms or conditions of probation; or 
(b) The defendant has successfully completed and graduated from an authorized 
drug court program or mental health court program and during any period of 
probation that may have been served following such graduation, the court did not 
find, and the defendant did not admit, in any probation violation proceeding that the 
defendant violated any of the terms or conditions of probation; 
the court may, if convinced by the showing made that there is no longer cause for 
continuing the period of probation, and if it be compatible with the public interest, 
terminate the sentence or set aside the plea of guilty or conviction of the defendant, and 
finally dismiss the case and discharge the defendant or may amend the judgment of 
conviction from a term in the custody of the state board of correction to "confinement in 
a penal facility" for the number of days served prior to suspension, and the amended 
judgment may be deemed to be a misdemeanor conviction. This shall apply to the 
cases in which defendants have been convicted and granted probation by the court 
before this law goes into effect, as well as to cases which arise thereafter. The final 
dismissal of the case as herein provided shall have the effect of restoring the defendant 
to his civil rights. 
(2) If sentence has been imposed but suspended for any period during the first three 
hundred sixty-five (365) days of a sentence to the custody of the state board of 
correction, and the defendant placed upon probation as provided in subsection 4. of 
section 19-2601, Idaho Code, upon application of the defendant, the prosecuting 
attorney, or upon the court's own motion, and upon satisfactory showing that: 
(a) The court did not find, and the defendant did not admit, in any probation violation 
proceeding that the defendant violated any of the terms or conditions of probation; or 
(b) The defendant has successfully completed and graduated from an authorized 
drug court program or mental health court program and during any period of 
probation that may have been served following such graduation, the court did not 
find, and the defendant did not admit, in any probation violation proceeding that the 
defendant violated any of the terms or conditions of probation; 
the court may amend the judgment of conviction from a term in the custody of the state 
board of correction to "confinement in a penal facility" for the number of days served 
prior to suspension, and the amended judgment may be deemed to be a misdemeanor 
conviction. 
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(3) Subsection (2) of this section shall not apply to any judgment of conviction for a 
violation of any offense requiring sex offender registration as set forth in section 18-
8304, Idaho Code. A judgment of conviction for a violation of any offense requiring sex 
offender registration as set forth in section 18-8304, Idaho Code, shall not be subject to 
dismissal or reduction under this section. A conviction for the purposes of this chapter 
means that the person has pled guilty or has been found guilty, notwithstanding the 
form of the judgment or withheld judgment. 
Credits 
S.L. 1915, ch. 104, § 1; S.L. 1919, ch. 134, § 2; S.L. 1951, ch. 99, § 1; S.L. 1970, ch. 
143, § 4; S.L. 1971, ch. 97, § 2; S.L. 1989, ch. 305, § 1; S.L. 2006, ch. 104, § 1, eff. July 
1, 2006; S.L. 2006, ch. 157, § 1, eff. July 1, 2006. Amended by S.L. 2010, ch. 350, § 2, 
eff. July 1, 2010; S.L. 2011, ch. 187, § 1, eff. July 1, 2011. 
Codifications: C.L. 1919, § 8002; C.S. 1919, § 9046; I.C.A. § 19-2506. 
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Ch.187 
H.B. No. 226 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE--SUSPENSION OR REVOCATION 
AN ACT RELATING TO SUSPENSION OF JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE; 
AMENDING SECTION 19-2604, IDAHO CODE, TO REVISE PROVISIONS RELATING 
TO THE DISCHARGE OF DEFENDANT AND THE AMENDMENT OF JUDGMENT. 
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho: 
SECTION 1. That Section 19-2604, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby amended 
to read as follows: 
« 10 ST § 19-2604 » 
§ 19-2604. Discharge of defendant--Amendment of judgment 
(1) If sentence has been imposed but suspended, or if sentence has been withheld, 
upon application of the defendant and upon satisfactory showing that the defendant has 
at all times complied with the terms and conditions upon which he was placed on 
probation, : 
(a) The court did not find, and the defendant did not admit, in any probation violation 
proceeding that the defendant violated any of the terms or conditions of probation; or 
(b) The defendant has successfully completed and graduated from an authorized 
drug court program or mental health court program and has at all times complied 
'Nith the terms and conditions of probation during any period of probation that may 
have been served following such graduation, the court did not find, and the 
defendant did not admit, in any probation violation proceeding that the defendant 
violated any of the terms or conditions of probation; 
the court may, if convinced by the showing made that there is no longer cause for 
continuing the period of probation, and if it be compatible with the public interest, 
terminate the sentence or set aside the plea of guilty or conviction of the defendant, and 
finally dismiss the case and discharge the defendant~ or may amend the judgment 
of conviction from a term in the custody of the state board of correction to "confinement 
in a penal facility" for the number of days served prior to suspension, and the amended 
judgment may be deemed to be a misdemeanor conviction. Tt--his shall apply to the 
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cases in which defendants have been convicted and granted probation by the court 
before this law goes into effect, as well as to cases which arise thereafter. The final 
dismissal of the case as herein provided shall have the effect of restoring the defendant 
to his civil rights. 
(2) If sentence has been imposed but suspended for any period during the first three 
hundred sixty-five (365) days of a sentence to the custody of the state board of 
correction, and the defendant placed upon probation as provided in subsection 4. of 
section 19-2601, Idaho Code, upon application of the defendant, the prosecuting 
attorney, or upon the court's own motion, and upon satisfactory showing that tAe 
defendant has at all times complied ,<,\lith the terms and conditions of his probation, : 
(a) The court did not find, and the defendant did not admit, in any probation violation 
proceeding that the defendant violated any of the terms or conditions of probation; or 
(b) The defendant has successfully completed and graduated from an authorized 
drug court program or mental health court program and has at all times complied 
with the terms and conditions of his probation during any period of probation that 
may have been served following such graduation, the court did not find, and the 
defendant did not admit, in any probation violation proceeding that the defendant 
violated any of the terms or conditions of probation; 
the court may amend the judgment of conviction from a term in the custody of the state 
board of correction to "confinement in a penal facility" for the number of days served 
prior to suspension, and the amended judgment may be deemed to be a misdemeanor 
conviction. 
(3) Subsection (2) of this section shall not apply to any judgment of conviction for a 
violation of any offense requiring sex offender registration as set forth in section 18-
8304, Idaho Code. A judgment of conviction for a violation of any offense requiring sex 
offender registration as set forth in section 18-8304, Idaho Code, shall not be subject to 
dismissal or reduction under this section. A conviction for the purposes of this chapter 
means that the person has pled guilty or has been found guilty, notwithstanding the 
form of the judgment or withheld judgment. 
Approved on the 5th day of April, 2011. 
Effective: July 1, 2011. 
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Ch.350 
S.B. No. 1383 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-SUSPENSION OR REVOCATION-JUDGMENTS AND 
DECREES 
AN ACT RELATING TO THE SUSPENSION OF JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE; 
AMENDING SECTION 19-2601, IDAHO CODE, TO EXTEND THE PERIOD OF TIME 
THE COURT RETAINS JURISDICTION OVER A PRISONER AND TO PROVIDE 
THAT THE STATE BOARD OF CORRECTION SHALL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR 
DETERMINING THE APPROPRIATE PLACEMENT, EDUCATION, PROGRAMMING 
AND TREATMENT OF PRISONERS DURING THE PERIOD OF RETAINED 
JURISDICTION; AND AMENDING SECTION 19-2604, IDAHO CODE, TO REVISE 
PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE AMENDMENT OF JUDGMENT. 
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho: 
SECTION 2. That Section 19-2604, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby amended 
to read as follows: 
« 10 ST § 19-2604 » 
§ 19-2604. Discharge of defendant-Amendment of judgment 
(1) If sentence has been imposed but suspended, or if sentence has been withheld, 
upon application of the defendant and upon satisfactory showing that the defendant has 
at all times complied with the terms and conditions upon which he was placed on 
probation, or has successfully completed and graduated from an authorized drug court 
program or mental health court program and has at all times complied with the terms 
and conditions of probation during any period of probation that may have been served 
following such graduation, the court may, if convinced by the showing made that there is 
no longer cause for continuing the period of probation, and if it be compatible with the 
public interest, terminate the sentence or set aside the plea of guilty or conviction of the 
defendant, and finally dismiss the case and discharge the defendant; and this shall 
apply to the cases in which defendants have been convicted and granted probation by 
the court before this law goes into effect, as well as to cases which arise thereafter. The 
final dismissal of the case as herein provided shall have the effect of restoring the 
defendant to his civil rights. 
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(2) If sentence has been imposed but suspended for any period during the first eAe 
three hundred eighty sixty-five (t80 365) days of a sentence to the custody of the state 
board of correction, and the defendant placed upon probation as provided in subsection 
4. of section 19-2601, Idaho Code, upon application of the defendant, the prosecuting 
attorney, or upon the court's own motion, and upon satisfactory showing that the 
defendant has at all times complied with the terms and conditions of his probation, or 
has successfully completed and graduated from an authorized drug court program or 
mental health court program and has at all times complied with the terms and conditions 
of probation during any period of probation that may have been served following such 
graduation, the court may amend the judgment of conviction from a term in the custody 
of the state board of correction to "confinement in a penal facility" for the number of 
days served prior to suspension, and the amended judgment may be deemed to be a 
misdemeanor conviction. 
(3) Subsection (2) of this section shall not apply to any judgment of conviction for a 
violation of any offense requiring sex offender registration as set forth in section 18-
8304, Idaho Code. A judgment of conviction for a violation of any offense requiring sex 
offender registration as set forth in section 18-8304, Idaho Code, shall not be subject to 
dismissal or reduction under this section. A conviction for the purposes of this chapter 
means that the person has pled guilty or has been found guilty, notwithstanding the 
form of the judgment or withheld judgment. 
Approved on the 12th day of April, 2010. 
Effective: July 1, 2010. 
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Ch. 157 
S.B. No. 1304 
CRIMES AND OFFENSES-SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION 
AN ACT RELATING TO CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; AMENDING SECTION 19-2604, 
IDAHO CODE, TO SET FORTH PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO JUDGMENTS FOR 
OFFENSES REQUIRING SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION, TO CLARIFY THE 
TERM "CONVICTION" AND TO MAKE TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS. 
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho: 
SECTION 1. That Section 19-2604, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby amended 
to read as follows: 
« 10 ST § 19-2604» 
19-2604. Discharge of defendant-amendment of judgment 
(1)7 If sentence has been imposed but suspended, or if sentence has been withheld, 
upon application of the defendant and upon satisfactory showing that the defendant has 
at all times complied with the terms and conditions upon which he was placed on 
probation, the court may, if convinced by the showing made that there is no longer 
cause for continuing the period of probation, and if it be compatible with the public 
interest, terminate the sentence or set aside the plea of guilty or conviction of the 
defendant, and finally dismiss the case and discharge the defendant; and this shall 
apply to the cases in which defendants have been convicted and granted probation by 
the court before this law goes into effect, as well as to cases which arise thereafter. The 
final dismissal of the case as herein provided shall have the effect of restoring the 
defendant to his civil rights. 
(2)-: If sentence has been imposed but suspended during the first one hundred aM 
eighty (180) days of a sentence to the custody of the state board of correction, and the 
defendant placed upon probation as provided in subsection 4. of section 19-2601, 
Idaho Code, upon application of the defendant, the prosecuting attorney, or upon the 
court's own motion, and upon satisfactory showing that the defendant has at all times 
complied with the terms and conditions of his probation, the court may amend the 
judgment of conviction from a term in the custody of the state board of correction to 
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"confinement in a penal facility" for the number of days served prior to suspension, and 
the amended judgment may be deemed to be a misdemeanor conviction. 
(3)-: Subsection (2) of this section shall not apply to any judgment of conviction for a 
violation of the provisions of sections 18 1506, 18 1507 or 18 1508 any offense 
requiring sex offender registration as set forth in section 18-8304, Idaho Code. A 
judgment of conviction for a violation of the provisions of any section listed in this 
subsection any offense requiring sex offender registration as set forth in section 18-
8304, Idaho Code, shall not be expunged from a person's criminal record subject to 
dismissal or reduction under this section. A conviction for the purposes of this chapter 
means that the person has pled guilty or has been found guilty, notwithstanding the 
form of the judgment or withheld judgment. 
Approved on the 22nd day of March, 2006. 
Effective: July 1, 2006. 
Statement of Purpose 
RS15656 
The purpose of this act is to update subsection 3 to except all offenses requiring 
sexual offender registration as set forth in Idaho Code 18-8304 from the dismissal or 
reduction of conviction provisions of subsections 1 and 2 of the act. The act presently 
only prohibits judicial dismissal or reduction of the conviction to a misdemeanor for 
sexual offenders convicted of sexual abuse of a child under the age of sixteen (16) 
years, Idaho Code 18-1506, sexual exploitation of a child, Idaho Code 18-1507, and 
lewd conduct with a minor child under sixteen (16), Idaho Code 18-1508. Sexual 
offenders are often compliant with probation conditions but continue to present a 
significant risk of recidivism. Efforts of law enforcement agencies to protect their 
communities by identifying past offenders, conduct investigations, and quickly 
apprehend the offender who commits a successive sexual offense, are impaired so long 
as some sexual offenders are able to have their convictions dismissed or reduced to a 
misdemeanor. This amendment will assist law enforcement in the protection of children 
and other potential victims and afford a much-needed added measure of protection to 
Idaho citizens. 
Fiscal Note 
This bill has no fiscal impact. 
Contact Name: William A. von Tagen Office of the Attorney General 
Phone: 334-4140 
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Ch. 104 
H.B. No. 716 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-DISCHARGE-MEDICAL CARE AND TREATMENT 
AN ACT RELATING TO CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; AMENDING SECTION 19-2604, 
IDAHO CODE, TO PROVIDE THAT A DEFENDANT MAY BE DISCHARGED OR A 
JUDGMENT AMENDED UPON A SHOWING RELATING TO THE DEFENDANT'S 
GRADUATION FROM A DRUG COURT PROGRAM OR MENTAL HEALTH COURT 
PROGRAM AND COMPLIANCE WITH ANY APPLICABLE PROBATION TERMS AND 
CONDITIONS AND TO MAKE TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS. 
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho: 
SECTION 1. That Section 19-2604, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby amended 
to read as follows: 
« ID ST § 19-2604 » 
19-2604. Discharge of defendant-amendment of judgment 
(17) If sentence has been imposed but suspended, or if sentence has been withheld, 
upon application of the defendant and upon satisfactory showing that the defendant has 
at all times complied with the terms and conditions upon which he was placed on 
probation, or has successfully completed and graduated from an authorized drug court 
program or mental health court program and has at all times complied with the terms 
and conditions of probation during any period of probation that may have been served 
following such graduation, the court may, if convinced by the showing made that there is 
no longer cause for continuing the period of probation, and if it be compatible with the 
public interest, terminate the sentence or set aside the plea of guilty or conviction of the 
defendant, and finally dismiss the case and discharge the defendant; and this shall 
apply to the cases in which defendants have been convicted and granted probation by 
the court before this law goes into effect, as well as to cases which arise thereafter. The 
final dismissal of the case as herein provided shall have the effect of restoring the 
defendant to his civil rights. 
(27) If sentence has been imposed but suspended during the first one hundred eighty 
(180) days of a sentence to the custody of the state board of correction, and the 
defendant placed upon probation as provided in subsection 4. of section 19-2601, 
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Idaho Code, upon application of the defendant, the prosecuting attorney, or upon the 
court's own motion, and upon satisfactory showing that the defendant has at all times 
complied with the terms and conditions of his probation, or has successfully completed 
and graduated from an authorized drug court program or mental health court program 
and has at all times complied with the terms and conditions of probation during any 
period of probation that may have been served following such graduation, the court may 
amend the judgment of conviction from a term in the custody of the state board of 
correction to "confinement in a penal facility" for the number of days served prior to 
suspension, and the amended judgment may be deemed to be a misdemeanor 
conviction. 
(3-;-) Subsection (2) of this section shall not apply to any judgment of conviction for a 
violation of the provisions of section 18-1506, 18-1507 or 18-1508, Idaho Code. A 
judgment of conviction for a violation of the provisions of any section listed in this 
subsection shall not be expunged from a person's criminal record. 
Approved on the 22nd day of March, 2006. 
Effective: July 1, 2006. 
Statement of Purpose 
RS16065 
Under Idaho Code 19-2604, criminal defendants who are placed on probation 
may have their convictions set aside if: (1) they have "at all times complied with the 
terms and conditions' of probation; (2) there is no longer cause for continuing probation; 
and (3) terminating probation and setting aside the conviction is compatible with the 
public interest. Similarly, defendants who are placed on retained jurisdiction (a "rider") 
and subsequently receive probation may have their felony convictions reduced to 
misdemeanors if they have "at all times complied with the terms and conditions" of 
probation. This bill would allow graduates of drug courts and mental health courts to 
seek the relief provided by this statute if they successfully complete the drug court or 
mental health court program and comply with all conditions of probation following their 
graduation. The persons admitted to drug court and mental health court have often 
committed violations of probation prior to their admission; in many cases, it is precisely 
those violations that lead to their admission to drug court and mental health court, and 
thus provide them with an opportunity to confront their problems and turn their lives 
around. Allowing these persons to have their convictions set aside or reduced following 
a completely satisfactory performance in drug court or mental health court would 
provide them with an added performance incentive and would enhance the 
effectiveness of these courts. 
Fiscal Note 
This bill would have no impact on the general fund. 
Contact Name: Patricia Tobias, Administrative Director of the Courts 
Phone:(208) 334-2246 
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